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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court ruled in Board of Education, Island Trees Union
Free School District No. 26 v. Pico,' that the first amendment precludes
school authorities from removing books from the school library because they
disagree with the viewpoints represented in the books. The Court's opinion
rested upon the proposition that, under our constitutional scheme, government
may not suppress particular ideas. Although this proposition seems unexcep-
tional in light of the evolution of first amendment jurisprudence, the Court has
regularly been troubled by the application of this principle in particular con-
* Professor of Law, University of Wyoming School of Law. A.B. Washington
University, 1968; J.D. Northwestern University, 1972. I am grateful to my colleague,
Ted Lauer, and my former colleague, John Myers, who commented on an earlier draft
of this article. I also wish to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance of Sherrill
Veal and Tamara Vincelette.
1. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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texts such as the public school setting. Indeed, four justices in Pico dissented
from the Court's holding and concluded that school library book removal deci-
sions do not present a constitutional issue.2
The plurality and dissenting opinions in Pico disagreed most sharply on
the appropriateness of judicial review of decisions reached by local school au-
thorities. The Court has consistently expressed the view that state and local
officials are primarily responsible for educational matters, and that courts gen-
erally should defer to their decisions. 3 Underlying this proposition, as the dis-
sent argues, is the fact that school boards are locally elected bodies, and thus,
particularly reflective of and responsive to the will of the local community.4
Moreover, in an area such as educational policy-making, where discretionary
judgments are frequently necessary, there is reason to question whether courts
are any better situated institutionally than school officials to resolve the diffi-
cult questions which arise. Not only might the courts lack the resources and
expertise available to professional educators or elected officials, but they also
may not be able to develop and articulate suitable standards for the resolution
of educational issues.5
The Pico decision, therefore, presents the fundamental question of the ap-
propriateness of judicial review of student first amendment claims challenging
curriculum-related decisions reached by public school officials. The issue has
been-and should be-framed in terms of legitimacy and competency.' The
legitimacy issue addresses the judiciary's role in identifying and implementing
constitutional values as a check on the authority of governmental officials.7
The argument that judicial review is illegitimate in cases such as Pico assumes
a properly functioning democratic decisionmaking process which is reflected in
2. Five Justices voted to sustain the plaintiffs' claim that the Island Trees
school board's decision to remove nine books from the junior high school and high
school libraries posed first amendment problems. Id. at 875. Justice Brennan authored
the Court's plurality opinion for himself and Justices Marshall and Stevens. Id. at 855-
75. Justices Blackmun and White each concurred in separate opinions. Id. at 875-82
(Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 883-84 (White, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor each filed dissenting opinions. Id. at
885-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 893-903 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 909-20
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
3. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
(1969); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 402 (1923).
4. Pico, 457 U.S. at 894 (Powell, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 894-95 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also id. at 890-91 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
6. M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKING AND THE COURTS
3-5 (1982); Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 38 (1978). The
article will treat the questions of legitimacy and competency separately but it has been
forcefully argued that the two concepts are inherently interrelated. See M. REBELL &
A. BLOCK, supra at 10 n.52; Fiss, supra at 38.
7. M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 6, at 5-10; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 9 (1978); Fiss, supra note 6, at 34.
[Vol. 50
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the school board and, by extension, in the officials and teachers retained to run
the schools. The competency question relates to the ability of courts to provide
a viable forum for the resolution of constitutional claims such as student first
amendment challenges to library and curriculum decisions.8 Each of these con-
cerns goes to the heart of the judicial process and the proper role to be as-
sumed by the courts in reviewing constitutional claims.
A considerable number of school library book removal incidents preceded
the Pico litigation. 9 Similar incidents involving school library collections 0 as
well as curriculum-related matters have continued in its wake." It is thus
troubling that the Court's Pico ruling reflects such sharp division among the
Justices on the basic question of judicial review. Although the Court specifi-
cally limited its decision to the library book removal issue, 2 the four Justices
in the majority who addressed the first amendment claims could not even
agree on an appropriate rationale. 3 Perhaps the Court can be taken at its
word and Pico should be narrowly construed as applicable only to the library
book removal issue. Supreme Court precedent, however, is rarely regarded as
so limited. Since a broader reading of Pico seemingly authorizes courts to con-
sider challenges to library acquisition and curricular decisions, the courts can
expect further litigation challenging the traditional authority of school
officials.' 4
8. See M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 6, at 11-15.
9. See, e.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th
Cir. 1980); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976);
Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School, 475 F. Supp.
615 (D. Vt. 1979),-affd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ.,
469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm.,
454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). See generally R. O'NEIL, CLASSROOMS IN THE
CROSSFIRE (1981).
10. See, e.g., Sheck v. Baileyville School Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me.
1982). See generally 32 NEWSLETTER ON INTELL. FREEDOM 137 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as NEWSLETTER].
11. See, e.g., Johnson v. Stuart, 702 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1983); Pratt v. Indepen-
dent School Dist. No. 831, Forest Lake, Minn., 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982). See
generally NEWLETTER, supra note 10.
12. 457 U.S. at 862 (plurality opinion).
13. The Court carefully limited its consideration to the question of the removal
of school library books. Id. at 862. Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, concluded
that students could claim a right to know based on the first amendment, id. at 868;
Justice Blackmun specifically disavowed reliance upon the right-to-know doctrine, id.
at 878 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
14. The cases to date have usually involved a first amendment challenge initi-
ated by students and their parents dissatisfied with a particular decision reached by
school officials or the school board, and, occasionally, a challenge commenced by teach-
ers unhappy with school board encroachment into their teaching prerogatives. See, e.g.,
Cary v. Board of Educ., Adams-Arapahoe School Dist., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979)
(teachers); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976)
(students and parents). Infrequently, students and teachers have joined together in liti-
gation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Stuart, 702 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1983). Pico was concerned
19851
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This article examines the limits of the Pico decision from the perspective
of the judicial review debate. The article will initially outline the Pico deci-
sion. The article will then examine the parameters of the first amendment
rights of secondary school students and suggest that Pico is consistent with the
Court's earlier jurisprudence regarding children's first amendment rights.
Next, the article will explore the government's interest in public education by
examining the two models of public education that have emerged from the
Supreme Court's opinions. The article will develop a multi-dimensional model
of public education and determine whether judicial deference is an appropriate
approach to first amendment controversies in the secondary schools in view of
this model and related first amendment considerations. Finally, the article will
address the judicial competency question by reexamining the Pico decision.
This will include an attempt to define the parameters of judicial review under
the first amendment of educational decisionmaking by appointed or elected
officials involving library acquisitions and curriculum matters.
II. THE Pico Decision
The Pico controversy arose during 1976 in New York when the school
board of the Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 concluded that
ten books contained within the secondary school libraries should be removed
and deleted from the curriculum.15 The board initially removed the books from
the high school and junior high school libraries for review after three board
members determined that the books were among those identified as "objection-
able" by a conservative state-wide parental organization.' 6 The superintendent
of schools objected to the board's removal decision and argued that the school
district should follow an established policy to review the questioned books. Al-
though the board did not follow the superintendent's suggestion, it subse-
exclusively with the question of student first amendment rights and this article, accord-
ingly, will focus on this issue. See generally Hunter, Curriculum, Pedagogy, and the
Constitutional Rights of Teachers in Secondary Schools, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1
(1983) (providing detailed examination of teacher rights and interests in the secondary
school setting).
15. Nine of the removed books were in the high school library: SLAUGHTER
HOUSE FIVE, by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; THE NAKED APE, by Desmond Morris; DOWN
THESE MEAN STREETS, by Piri Thomas; BEST SHORT STORIES OF NEGRO WRITERS,
edited by Langston Hughes; Go ASK ALICE, of anonymous authorship; LAUGHING
Boy, by Oliver LaFarge; BLACK Boy, by Richard Wright; A HERO AIN'T NOTHIN'
BUT A SANDWICH, by Alice Childress; and SOUL ON ICE, by Eldridge Cleaver. One
book, THE FIXER, by Bernard Malamud was included in the twelfth grade curriculum.
One book was removed from the junior high school library: A READER FOR WJUTERS,
edited by Jerome Archer. 457 U.S. at 856-57.
16. Three Island Trees School District board members had attended a Septem-
ber 1975 conference sponsored by Parents of New York United, a politically conserva-
tive organization of New York parents concerned about educational matters. At the
conference, a list of "objectionable" books was circulated. The Board relied on this list
to identify the ten removed books. 457 U.S. at 856.
[Vol. 50
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quently appointed a "Book Review Committee" to review the books and rec-
ommend whether they were suitable for use in the public schools.17 The
Committee eventually recommended that at least five of the books be retained
in the library,'8 but the board rejected the recommendation and returned only
one book to the library.'"
Several students, supported by their parents, filed suit in federal district
court alleging that the board's removal decision violated their first amendment
rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the school board,
concluding that judicial review of a school board's library book removal deci-
sion was inappropriate.2 0 The court found that the school board's removal de-
cision was based upon its conclusion that the books were "irrelevant, vulgar,
immoral, and in bad taste."'" The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the district court decision, holding that the students had stated a first amend-
ment claim in their challenge to the board's actions. 22 After granting certio-
rari, the Supreme Court divided evenly on the students' first amendment
claims, but it upheld their right to pursue legal redress on the constitutional
claim.21
17. The Book Review Committee was composed of four Island Trees parents
and four members of the Island Trees schools staff. The Committee was directed to
read the ten books and recommend whether they should be retained on the basis of
their "educational suitabililty," "good taste," "relevance," and "appropriateness to age
and grade level." Id. at 857.
18. The Committee recommended that LAUGHING Boy, BLACK Boy, Go ASK
ALICE, and BEST SHORT STORIES BY NEGRO WRITERS be retained in the school librar-
ies, and that THE FIXER be retained in the twelfth grade curriculum. Id. at 858 n.5.
The Committee also recommended that THE NAKED APE and DOWN THESE MEAN
STREETS be removed. Id. at 858 n.6. It was unable to agree regarding the disposition of
SOUL ON ICE and A HERO AIN'T NOTHIN' BUT A SANDWICH, id. at 858 n.7; it made
no recommendation on A READER FOR WRITERS, id. at 858 n.8; and it recommended
that SLAUGHTER HOUSE FIVE be retained for student use subject to prior parental ap-
proval. Id. at 858 n.9.
19. The Board returned LAUGHING Boy to the library, id. at 858 n.10, and it
made BLACK Boy available subject to parental approval. Id. at 858 n.11.
20. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 474
F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 853
(1982).
21. Id. at 392.
22., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), aft'd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). The court of ap-
peals panel split two-one in voting to reverse the district court decision. Judge Sifton,
writing for the court, concluded that the school board's intervention into library affairs
was irregular and raised the possibility that board members had acted to suppress free
speech notwithstanding their purported justifications. Id. at 417. Judge Newnan con-
curred in the result and asserted that the case turned on whether as a question of fact
the board had acted permissibly to remove books with sexually explicit material or
vulgarity, or whether the board had acted impermissibly to suppress particular ideas.
Id. at 436-37. Judge Mansfield dissented arguing that the factual record supported the
district court's conclusion that the board had acted permissibly to remove books which
were indecent and educationally unsuitable. Id. at 430.
23. See supra note 2. Justice White, who supplied the critical fifth vote to af-
1985]
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Justice Brennan, writing the Court's plurality opinion, concluded that stu-
dents' first amendment rights were "sharply and directly implicated" by the
board's removal decision 24 and that these rights prevailed despite the board's
inherent authority over educational matters. Justice Brennan asserted that mi-
nor students, like adults, are entitled to claim a right to receive information
under the first amendment 5 and that the school library is uniquely situated as
a conveyor of information in the school environment.26 Since a school board
decision to remove books from the library would infringe upon the students'
right to receive information, the board's decision could be justified only if it
was reached for some reason other than to suppress the ideas contained in the
books. Justice Brennan indicated that the students were entitled to prevail on
their first amendment claim if the board's removal decision was improperly
motivated and based solely on its disagreement with the point of view ex-
pressed in the removed books.27 However, he suggested that removal decisions
based upon neutral criteria, such as "pervasive vulgarity" or "educational suit-
ability," were constitutionally permissible.28
Justice Blackmun concurred, and he similarly concluded that the crucial
first amendment inquiry was whether the school board removed the books be-
cause of its disagreement with the ideas contained within them. 9 Justice
Blackmun, however, specifically disavowed reliance upon the right to receive
information doctrine or the unique nature of the school library as a basis for
firm the court of appeals judgment, argued that the Court should avoid addressing the
first amendment issue raised in the case. Instead he felt that the matter should be
remanded to the district court in accordance with the Second Circuit's directives to
resolve the disputed factual issue regarding the motive for the school board's removal
decision. Id. at 883-84.
24. 457 U.S. at 866. The Court originally articulated this threshold standard
for the review of children's constitutional claims in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
104 (1968).
25. 457 U.S. at 866-67. Justice Brennan weaves several prior decisions together
to extract the right to receive information doctrine from the first amendment and tojustify its extension into the public school setting. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-763 (1972); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966));
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
143 (1943); see also 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910); infra
note 151 and accompanying text.
26. 457 U.S. at 868-69. Justice Brennan relied on the 1978 district court deci-
sion in Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass.
1978) to attribute first amendment characteristics to the school library: "[A] student
can literally explore the unknown, and discover areas of interest and thought not cov-
ered by the prescribed curriculum . . . . Th[e] student learns that a library is a place
to test or expand upon ideas presented to him, in or out of the classroom." 454 F. Supp.
at 715.
27. 457 U.S. at 871.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
[Vol. 50
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the decision.30 Instead, Justice Blackmun relied upon the first amendment
principle of governmental neutrality31 and argued that this doctrine was appli-
cable in the school environment to restrain the decisionmaking authority of
board officials. 32
The four dissenting justices, each of whom offered an opinion, took issue
with several of the conclusions reached by the prevailing plurality. The dis-
senters argued that the first amendment right to receive information doctrine
was inapplicable in the public schools3 3 and that the school library was indis-
tinguishable from other aspects of the educational program. 34 They noted that
the books removed from the school library were otherwise available to stu-
dents.35 The dissenters asserted that it was impossible to require "content neu-
trality" from school officials faced with book selection or removal decisions
since these officials were vested with the discretion to make and implement
educational decisions in accordance with prevailing community attitudes. They
pointed out that constitutional doctrine had always accorded local officials con-
siderable discretion in structuring academic and extracurricular school pro-
grams to fulfill the school's primary function of instilling students with funda-
mental values and preparing them for their roles as citizens.3 Application of
the plurality's doctrine, they argued, might affect the authority of school offi-
cials in areas outside the school library.
The dissenters also criticized the standards offered by Justice Bren-
nan-particularly the "educational suitability" decisionmaking criterion-as
imprecise, subjective, and unworkable. 7 Moreover, they asserted that judges
lacked the expertise available to local school officials to assess the appropriate-
ness of particular books in the school environment. 38 Finally, the dissenters
argued that judicial review of local school board decisions was basically anti-
democratic since it was likely to thwart representative governmental decision-
making at the local level where political accountability was assured.39
30. Id. at 878. Justice Blackmun was unwilling to conclude that school authori-
ties had an affirmative duty to supply students with information or ideas. Id. Addition-
ally, he asserted that if the public school curriculum could be designed to impart par-
ticular ideas and values to students, then the school library could likewise be enlisted in
this process. Id.
31. Id. at 880; see Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980). See generally Karst, Equality as a Central Princi-
ple in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20 (1975).
32. 457 U.S. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 887-89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 910-15 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
34. Id. at 915 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 886 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 915 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 896 (Powell, J., dissenting); id.
at 913-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 890 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 895 (Powell, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 890-91 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 894 (Powell, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 891 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 897 (Powell, J., dissenting); id.
at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
19851
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The Pico opinions reflect several different strands of constitutional doc-
trine developed by the Court in reviewing claims arising in the public educa-
tion setting. The Court had previously recognized student first amendment
rights, but it had not clearly extended first amendment doctrine to embrace
student challenges to curriculum-related matters such as library book removal
decisions. The Court takes this step in Pico, but it does not fully identify and
assess secondary students' first amendment interests in the public school set-
ting or reconcile its conclusions with its general approach to children's consti-
tutional rights claims. Thus, the Pico decision should be re-evaluated from the
perspective of general first amendment theory and from the perspective of pre-
vious decisions involving children's claims to constitutional protection. Fur-
thermore, in Pico several members of the Court were reluctant to embrace a
comprehensive view of public education which takes into account the societal
and individual interests that are served by the public schools. In view of the
first amendment considerations that underlie much educational decisionmak-
ing, it is evident that the Court should not unduly limit its vision of the public
education process. Therefore, the Court's concept of public education should
be reviewed.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CHILDREN
In recent years the Court has extended various constitutional rights to
minors, providing them with protection against arbitrary or overreaching gov-
ernmental actions. For instance, minors facing juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings are entitled to a plethora of due process protections.40 A minor female
who can demonstrate her maturity is entitled to procure an abortion without
state or parental interference. 41 These rights, however, are not equivalent to
those available to an adult in analogous circumstances. 42 It is the Court's per-
ception-and society's traditional view-that minors generally are not mature
enough to handle effectively all of the responsibilities that attach to adulthood
and that they are potentially subject to exploitation at the hands of others.43
To determine which constitutional rights children might claim, the Court
has examined the importance of the right to the individual child and the po-
tential adverse consequences which might follow without its recognition.44 Fur-
40. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398(1981); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481
(1983).
42. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Compare Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (constitutional right to abortion) with Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979) (constitutional rights of minors cannot be equated with those of
adults, but state cannot require parental consent for all abortions involving minors).
43. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 634.
44. In Bellotti, the Court concluded that a child's abortion decision was entitled
to constitutional privacy protection because it portended long-term and severe conse-
[Vol. 50
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thermore, the Court has balanced the child's individual interest against the
state's paternalistic concern for the child and its support of parental autonomy
in child-rearing matters. The clearest exposition of this approach is set forth in
Bellotti v. Baird" where Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, articulated
several reasons why minors could not claim full constitutional protection: their
vulnerability; their inability to reach important decisions in a mature, reflec-
tive manner; and the critical role of their parents in child-rearing. 0 The Court
has expressed similar reservations to justify limiting the scope of constitutional
protection available to children in the first amendment area.4 7 Nevertheless,
the Court has held that children should receive some first amendment protec-
tion in the public school setting. The Pico decision, however, indicates that the
Justices are not in agreement regarding the extension of first amendment pro-
tection into curricular matters. Therefore, it is necessary to examine why first
amendment protection is important in the case of schoolchildren, and to deter-
mine whether traditional first amendment doctrine can be accommodated to
the special legal status of children.
A. First Amendment Theory and the Child
The Supreme Court and legal scholars have recognized that the first
amendment secures and advances several different values implicit in our demo-
cratic scheme of government. First amendment interpretation has emphasized
not only the value of the amendment in protecting individual citizens against
an overreaching state, but it also has recognized the role of the amendment in
advancing the collective interests of the state's citizenry through the political
process.4 Constitutional theorists have argued that, among other things, the
first amendment is designed to promote individual self-fulfillment, enhance the
quences for her and it required a prompt resolution. See id. at 642-43. In Carey, the
plurality and the concurring justices were concerned that refusal to safeguard a minor's
access to nonhazardous contraception devices created the unreasonable risk of teenage
pregnancy and its attendant difficulties. Carey v. Population Servs., Inc., 431 U.S. 678,
693-94 (1977) (plurality opinion).
45. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
46. Id. at 634.
47. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515
(1969) (Stewart J., concurring); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968);
see also Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Dist., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir.
1980).
48. Compare T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970)
(applying the legal foundations for freedom of expression to the solution of concrete
problems posed by modern conditions) and Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 591 (1982) ("Individual self-realization" is primary value of free speech;
acceptance of this principle affects the level and form of constitutional protection given
to expression) with A. MEIKELJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960) (distinguishing be-
tween freedom to speak on public matters, which is protected by the first amendment,
and "liberty" to speak on private matters which is protected by the due process clause)
and Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971) (constitutional protection should only be provided for political speech).
1985]
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opportunity for individual participation in governmental decisionmaking, and
advance knowledge and the discovery of truth. 9 The Court has not ascribed a
definitive principal purpose to the first amendment; rather, it has relied upon
general theories. In its decisions recognizing .first amendment rights for chil-
dren, the Court has alluded to one or more of these values as they relate to
children-particularly secondary school children-to determine the extent to
which they should receive first amendment protection in the school setting.50
The value of individual self-fulfillment implies personal growth and devel-
opment to realize one's full potential. First amendment protection provides
adults with a broad range of freedom to inquire, experiment, and sample soci-
ety's intellectual and other offerings."1 In many respects childhood and its ex-
periences form the foundation-a very critical foundation according to psy-
chologists-for the process of development into adulthood. 2 Without doubt
the child's parents play the primary role during this developmental period,
especially in the early stages preceding adolescence.5 3 Additionally, the schools
play an important role in this process, one which increases during adolescence.
If one goal to be served by the first amendment is the maturation of indi-
vidual promise and the establishment of a sense of individual dignity, then it
seems intuitively correct to conclude that the child should be provided some
opportunity for experimentation and inquiry." Certainly this makes sense as
49. T. EMERSON, supra note 48, at 6-7; Karst, Equality as a Central Principle
in the First Amendment, 43 U. CH. L. REV. 20, 23-26 (1975). It is not the purpose of
this article to suggest a particular first amendment theory or to argue in support of one
or more of the propounded theories. Rather, the article will examine the first amend-
ment interests of children in relation to the general values recognized by Professor
Emerson. Regarding the various theories suggested for the first amendment, see, e.g.,
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964
(1978); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Sub-
stance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1978); Bork, supra note 48; Red-
ish, supra note 48.
50. Professor Garvey has addressed this question in detail in Garvey, Children
and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 321 (1979). He argues that first amend-
ment rights for children should serve instrumental purposes; that is, that children's first
amendment rights should be defined with reference to the role which constitutional
protection will play in assuring their growth and development into independent, autono-
mous beings. Id. at 344-49. This article agrees with Professor Garvey's basic proposi-
tion that constitutional protection must take account of the child's growth and develop-
ment interests, but it also argues that the values underlying particular constitutional
protections-like the first amendment-retain an independent vitality even in the case
of children. Thus, the article argues for a broader view of children's first amendment
rights--one that encompasses the intrinsic values reflected in the amendment.
51. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 756-57 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
52. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 9-28 (1973); Watson, Children, Families and the Courts: Before the Best
Interests of the Child and Parham v. J.R., 66 VA. L. REv. 653, 662-67 (1980).
53. Watson, supra note 52, at 664.
54. See Garvey, supra note 50, at 344-50.
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the child matures and is able to assimilate and process different ideas against
a background of accumulated experience and established judgment. While this
rationale suggests that the child should enjoy some freedom from absolute pa-
rental control, it even more strongly suggests that the child should be assured
freedom from undue state efforts through the educational process to narrow
and limit his horizons, particularly at the secondary grade level.
Another major value attributed to the first amendment is its role in assur-
ing individual participation in governmental decisionmaking processes.5.5 This
value serves the individual since it assures him an opportunity to engage in the
public discourse, share in the marketplace of ideas, and enter the political
arena. The value also promotes participatory democratic ideals since it is
designed to open the channels of information gathering and sharing and, thus,
facilitate individual involvement in the governing process. The most apparent
means of effective participation in governmental decisionmaking is through the
ballot box, but this first amendment value is not limited to assuring only this
type of participation.5" Rather, this value encompasses a full range of individ-
ual activities which have some bearing-immediate or otherwise-upon gov-
ernmental decisionmaking. 57
This is significant in the case of children since their participation in the
political.process is obviously limited until they reach voting age. Children pre-
sumably are exposed to the basic ideals underlying our governmental structure
through their parents and the schools. In fact, the transmittal of fundamental
social and political values has been recognized as one of the primary functions
of public education.58 Again, it makes sense to conclude that children should
enjoy some freedom to experience opposing viewpoints on public issues (some
of which have a direct bearing upon their lives) and to participate in the deci-
sionmaking process even if their participation is limited.
It is difficult to imagine that a child who has been indoctrinated in demo-
55. It should be noted that Professor Emerson attributes four functions (not
three as suggested previously) to the first amendment. See T. EMERSON, supra note 48,
at 7. The fourth function envisions the first amendment as critical to "achieving a more
adaptable and hence stable community, of maintaining the precarious balance between
healthy cleavage and necessary consensus." Id. In many respects this value relates to
the role which the first amendment plays in assuring societal growth and development
through political and social channels open to the individual. For present purposes, it
neither adds, nor detracts substantially from the discussion if this value is subsumed in
the value of political participation..
56. Other constitutional provisions, including article I, § 2 and the fifteenth,
nineteenth, twenty-fourth and twenty-sixth amendments, specifically safeguard
franchise rights.
57. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444
U.S. 620 (1980) (door-to-door advocacy and solicitation of funds); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (expenditure of money); Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)
(peaceful picketing); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(symbolic protest); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (leafletting).
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cratic values can fully appreciate them if he has not been afforded the oppor-
tunity to confront conflicting views which test the strength of his commitment
to his learned principles.59 While the child's involvement in the political dia-
logue can be viewed as preparatory-anticipating his entry into the adult
world-it is still worthwhile from the perspective of the child and society to
extend first amendment protection. Society will ultimately be dependent upon
the child, at least in some small measure, for his future participation and con-
tributions. And, in the case of secondary students, it is evident that in a very
short time they will be granted the right to participate in the political process.
A third major value ascribed to the first amendment is the role which it
plays in advancing knowledge and discovering truth.6 0 Much of what has been
said about the individual and societal interests that are advanced by the other
first amendment values can be repeated here: the individual develops his intel-
lectual and analytical abilities through exposure to a broad range of informa-
tion and open, frank discussion of ideas. Likewise, societal progress depends
upon the aggregation of individual contributions to the community of
knowledge.
While children sometimes may lack the maturity and experience to ferret
out reliably the truth in the "marketplace of ideas" and to contribute signifi-
cantly to the societal discourse, this does not justify limiting their exposure to
various ideas and perspectives. Instead, these considerations again suggest that
some degree of freedom is advisable to prepare the child for a more substantial
participatory role once he achieves full maturity and gains additional experi-
ence. Sitting on the sidelines without the benefit of a spectrum of information
hardly prepares the child for this role. Moreover, in the case of children the
parallels between this first amendment value and the knowledge-imparting
mission of the public schools are considerable. 61 Even carefully structured par-
ticipation and exposure to the world of ideas for relatively young and imma-
ture children provides them with a base to develop an understanding and ap-
preciation of the complexities of the world and various branches of
knowledge.62 Certainly, as the child matures and gains perspective, his oppor-
tunities to explore new fields and develop insights should not be foreclosed.
Although first amendment values should not be discounted in the case of
a child, it is necessary to acknowledge certain limitations upon the extension of
first amendment protection to children. Children rarely, if ever, go it alone
59. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Garvey,
supra note 50, at 348.
60. See J. MILL, On Liberty, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 207-
08 (M. Cohen ed. 1961) (1859 essay by John Stuart Mill).
61. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) ("The American people
have always regarded education and the acquisition of knowledge as matters of su-
preme importance, which should be diligently promoted.").
62. See J. PHILLIPS, THE ORIGINS OF INTELLECT: PIAGET'S THEORY 139-61(1975); CHILDREN AND THEIR PRIMARY SCHOOLS ("The Plowden Report"), reprinted
in THE OPEN CLASSROoM READER 147 (C. Silberman, ed. 1973).
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during their childhood in our society. Several particularly influential persons
and institutions-parents, family members, and schools are among the most
noteworthy-protect and assist the child in his development. Consequently, a
child's opportunities for personal experiences are somewhat limited in the in-
terest of protecting and nurturing him."3 Too much freedom and opportunity
for experimentation may be harmful; conversely, too little may retard and un-
dermine the growth process. In either case, both the child and society suffer
since his full potential is not realized. Some accommodation is required to
provide the child with the opportunity for exposure to the larger world without
setting him completely adrift.
The state, relying upon its inherent police power, has attempted this ac-
commodation in two noteworthy ways. First, the state has established a divid-
ing line between childhood and adulthood-the age of majority-after which
the individual is granted full legal rights.64 Secondly, the state has provided
itself (through its schools and other relevant institutions) and parents with the
responsibility and authority to supervise a child before he reaches adulthood.65
But the courts should not simply defer to this scheme and regard children who
are under the age of majority as without rights. Many children reach maturity
well before the age of majority-usually during their secondary school
years-and are capable of assuming adult responsibilities.66 Furthermore, the
guidance and direction which the child receives from the state and his parents
is seldom value neutral.67
In the case of parents, it may make sense for the courts to support their
value judgments in raising their children even if this dramatically affects (as it
inevitably will) the child's development process.6 8 Certainly, our society ac-
63. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398 (1981).
64. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. 8-1-102(a) (iii) (B) (1977); Developments in the
Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1258 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Developments].
65. See Developments, supra note 64, at 1218-21. Of course, the parental right
to direct and supervise the upbringing of children has a constitutional dimension as
well. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
66. When this occurs the rationale for extending limited rights disappears. The
child is able to reach considered decisions and is unlikely to be vulnerable to exploita-
tion. Similarly, parental protection seems unnecessary. State reinforcement of parental
authority could undermine the family structure. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,
436-39 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally Keiter, Privacy, Children and
Their Parents: Reflections On and Beyond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN.
L. REv. 459 (1982).
67. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 438 n.24 (1981) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see also van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits
on Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEx. L. REv. 197, 239-62 (1983)
(arguing that students should be constitutionally protected by the first amendment
freedom of belief doctrine to guard against state efforts to transmit ideologically-in-
spired ideas and beliefs).
68. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court invalidated
1985]
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cords parents considerable deference in this regard. Only in limited circum-
stances-generally when the child can demonstrate maturity-does the first
amendment or any other constitutional provision undercut this position.69 In
the case of the state, however, it is far from clear that governmental value
judgments, except those which fall within certain general categories, 7 should
prevail and direct adolescent development in a particular manner in the face
of a first amendment claim.7 1
B. The Tinker-Ginsberg Dichotomy
As noted previously, the Court has addressed some of these issues, and it
has ruled in favor of extending first amendment protection to children. This is
particularly true in respect to efforts by the state to limit the child's opportu-
nity to participate in the public discourse or to gain exposure to viewpoints
an Oregon statute requiring all children in the state to attend public schools. In doing
so, the Court pointedly observed that parents, not the state, were primarily responsible
for raising their children:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not
the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.
Id. at 535. Thus, while the state can compel school attendance, it cannot foreclose the
option of private schools which limits government's impact upon the development of
children-at least in the case of those children who attend private school. See also
Garvey, supra note 50, at 322-33.
69. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (emancipated and demonstrably
mature minors entitled to make abortion decision without parental notification); Bel-
lotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (fourteenth amendment provides minor child with a
privacy right respecting her abortion decision); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the Amish school children are
entitled to overrule their parental decision regarding their education).
70. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (lower obscenity threshold
authorized for minors); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (minors can be
protected from sexually explicit speech).
71. There is a very real likelihood that the child will be joined by his parent in
opposition to value-laden state policies that are viewed as inimical to the child's wel-
fare. This pits both the parent and child against the state and reinforces the validity of
the child's claim for constitutional protection. All of the aforementioned cases raising
children's first amendment claims which were sustained by the Supreme Court involved
situations where the child's parent served as his next-friend to initiate the litigation.
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); West Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). It should be noted that the Court
has not addressed a child's first amendment claim in the setting where the interests of
parent and child clashed as, for instance, in the abortion context. See Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 241-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the child's
right to decide regarding his education prevails over a contrary parental decision). It is
beyond the scope of this article to undertake that task here.
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regarded as inappropriate. The Court, however, has been disinclined to accept
first amendment claims asserted on behalf of children when it has perceived
that the restraining governmental regulation is intended to safeguard children
against exposure to pornographic material. In this area, the Court has ac-
cepted more willingly governmental assertions that children should be pro-
tected from this material. The Court has concluded that governmental regula-
tory efforts against pornographic material meets with broad-based parental
approval and reinforces parental authority.
The Court's ruling in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District72
represents the Court's strongest endorsement of first amendment rights for
children. The Tinker rationale also reflects a keen sensitivity to the value con-
siderations justifying first amendment protection for children in the public
school setting. In Tinker, several school children challenged the authority of
school administrators to expel them for wearing black armbands to express
their opposition to the Vietnam War. After concluding that the first amend-
ment extended to this type of expressive activity, the Court stated:
Students in school as well as out of school are "persons" under our Constitu-
tion. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the state must respect,
just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In our
system, students may not be regarded as closed circuit recipients of only that
which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the
expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of a
specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, stu-
dents are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.73
The Court concluded that students who expressed their opinions on current,
controversial topics in the public school setting could be restrained only if
school officials demonstrated that their activities threatened to disrupt materi-
ally the school environment or infringe the rights of others.74
In Tinker the Court was acutely aware of the unique role the school plays
in introducing students to constitutional values and reinforcing them. The
Court recognized that although children might not presently participate in the
political process, it is appropriate for the state through its schools to foster an
appreciation and understanding on their part of the political and social milieu
and the dynamics of change. The Court observed:
• .. [T]he classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Na-
tion's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that ro-
bust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection." '
72. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
73. Id. at 511.
74. Id. at 513. While under Tinker officials cannot regulate the content of what
a student says, they can clearly regulate when, where, and how he expresses himself.
Thus, it is appropriate to equate the Tinker "substantial disruption" standard with the
more traditional first amendment time, manner, and place regulatory doctrine.
75. Id. at 512 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
1985]
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Additionally, the Court recognized that schools ran the risk of "strangl[ing]
the free mind at its source"76 if they did not carefully safeguard the constitu-
tional freedoms of students. The Court thus found the public school setting to
be largely consistent with the intrinsic values embraced by the first
amendment.
The Tinker requirement of official neutrality in regulating the content of
student speech, while consistent with the first amendment doctrine generally,77
is also consistent with other decisions addressing first amendment and related
constitutional claims arising in the school environment. The early Meyer v.
Nebraska7 8 decision struck down a Nebraska law prohibiting the teaching of
foreign languages in the state's public schools. Although the Court based its
holding on substantive due process concepts protective of parents' and teach-
ers' interests, it recognized the important role played by educational instruc-
tion in exposing children, even at relatively young ages, to a broad range of
material.7 9 Consequently, the state could not single out a particular subject or
area and preclude its instruction. Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,8°
the court relied upon substantive due process doctrine to strike down an Ore-
gon law which required that all students attend public schools. The Court rec-
ognized that the state had considerable supervisory authority over education,
including the right to design the curriculum of schools, but it held that the
state may not deny children and their parents the opportunity to seek an alter-
native educational experience in private schools: "The fundamental theory of
liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept in-
struction from public teachers only."81
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,82 the Court ruled
that the first amendment prohibited school officials from requiring students to
salute the flag because it invaded an area of belief and conscience reserved to
the individual. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, suggested that secular
education should avoid the adoption of particular ideological disciplines83 and
he admonished that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or for
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. 84 Furthermore, in Bar-
nette the Court recognized the critical role of the school as a forum for the
(1967)).
76. Id. at 507 (citing West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
637 (1943)).
77. See Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455 (1980); see also infra text accompanying notes 201-06.
78. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
79. Id. at 399.
80. 265 U.S. 510 (1925).
81. Id. at 535.
82. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
83. Id. at 637.
84. Id. at 642.
[Vol. 50
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introduction and conveyance of first amendment principles to students: "That
they [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to...
teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes." 85
More recently, in Epperson v. Arkansas," the Court relied upon the first
amendment's proscription against government entanglement with religion to
overturn an Arkansas statute prohibiting public school teachers from teaching
evolutionary theories. The Court required Arkansas to adopt a neutral position
on the instruction of evolution in its public schools. The Court asserted that
judicial intervention in the public school system, while requiring restraint, was
appropriate "to safeguard the fundamental values of freedom of speech and
inquiry and of belief."'87
The Tinker line of cases reflects several different strands of first amend-
ment doctrine. First, the cases recognize that students have expressive rights,
which include the right to speak on various topics and the right to refrain from
speaking.88 Students have the right to express themselves within school so long
as there is no substantial disruption of the school routine. Second, the cases
require governmental neutrality when school authorities endeavor to regulate
appropriate student expressive activities. The decisions impose a neutrality ob-
ligation on officials-at least in a very broad sense-when they structure the
school curriculum and program. Third, Tinker itself can be read to support
the proposition that the characteristics of the public school are sufficiently akin
to a traditional public forum to render it a particularly appropriate setting for
the exercise of first amendment rights.8
In Tinker and its predecessors, the Court did not seem particularly troub-
led about extending these first amendment protections to school children de-
spite their diminished legal capacity. The Court apparently concluded-at
least impliedly-that the Bellotti considerations did not supersede the first
amendment values at stake in the casesY0 First, the Court was not convinced
that the state was protecting the children from exploitation by others. The
85. Id. at 637.
86. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
87. Id. at 104.
88. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (recognizing a first amend-
ment right not to speak predicated upon the 1943 Barnette decision).
89. See infra text accompanying notes 155-60.
90. It should be pointed out that Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), had not
been decided when Tinker and earlier decisions were rendered, but the Court had al-
ready articulated several of the Bellotti factors as a justification for limiting the consti-
tutional protections available to children. See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969)(Stewart, J., concurring); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). This article
relies upon the Bellotti considerations in evaluating the Court's treatment of the first
amendment issue because Bellotti represents the Court's most comprehensive treatment
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Court perceived that the state itself was the exploiter since it was relying upon
its authoritative position to restrict impermissibly the expressive activities of
the students. Second, the Court was persuaded that children were mature
enough that they should be provided the opportunity to confront and consider
the important matters called into question by the government's regulatory ef-
forts. Third, the Court did not confront a situation where children and their
parents were in conflict; consequently, the government was not necessarily
lending a hand to parental authority by its regulatory activity. In each of these
cases, parents sided with their children in the legal challenge. Thus, Tinker
and the earlier cases can be easily reconciled with the Court's more recent
approach to the question of the scope of children's constitutional rights.
In a separate line of children's first amendment cases, however, the Court
has been disinclined to extend constitutional protection. When the state has
sought to regulate pornographic materials or activities to limit children's ac-
cess, the Court has generally deferred to the state's efforts. In Ginsberg v. New
York, 91 the Court held that the State of New York could apply a lower ob-
scenity standard in the case of children exposed to pornographic material. The
Court noted that the state had an independent interest in protecting the wel-
fare of children to assure their growth into mature, productive citizens.92 The
Court also observed that parents are primarily responsible for the growth and
well-being of their children and, accordingly, parents are entitled to state leg-
islative support to assist them in these efforts.93 The Court, therefore, con-
cluded that it was reasonable for the legislature to adopt a variable obscenity
standard in the case of minors to safeguard them from potential harm from
exposure to this type of material.94
More recently, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,"5 the Court ruled that the
FCC could preclude the radio broadcast of "patently offensive sexual and ex-
cretory speech" during regular daytime broadcasting hours. The Court's deci-
sion was based in part upon its concern that children who might be un-
supervised were likely to be in the audience. 98 Although Pacifica did not deal
with the obscenity issue, the Court noted that under Ginsberg the government
could regulate speech directed toward children on a more flexible basis than
under the adult obscenity standard.9 7 The court reiterated the governmental
interest in safeguarding the welfare of children and supporting parental au-
thority.98 In New York v. Ferber,99 the Court upheld a New York statute
prohibiting the use of children in the production of child pornography. The
91. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
92. Id. at 640.
93. Id. at 639.
94. Id. at 641-42.
95. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
96. Id. at 749-50.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 749.
99. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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defendants challenged the Ginsberg variable obscenity standard on first
amendment grounds and asserted the overbreadth doctrine. The Court ob-
served that "It] he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children con-
stitutes a government objective of surpassing importance." 00
These decisions demonstrate that, in the areas of obscenity and pornogra-
phy, the Court has given considerable credence to the Bellotti factors to justify
limiting first amendment protection in the case of children. The court was
clearly concerned about the possibility that children might be exploited and
that they might lack the judgmental capacity to respond maturely or knowl-
edgeably to obscene-like material. Perhaps more importantly, the Court could
conclude that its ruling generally comported with parental interests in this as-
pect of childrearing.
The Ginsberg line of cases, however, does not undercut the rationale de-
veloped in the Tinker line of cases for extending first amendment protection to
children. In the case of adults, the Court has ruled that obscene material is
unprotected under the first amendment because it has no social value.' 0' If
obscene speech is so lightly regarded for adults, the Court can and should
similarly depreciate its value in the case of children. Obscene or pornographic
material is unlikely to contribute to children's developmental growth or en-
hance their social-political contributions. 10 2 Thus, a state policy limiting chil-
dren's access can be viewed as consistent with the first amendment goal of
promoting individual growth and development. Such a policy will not under-
mine children's ability to contribute to the political discourse or to develop an
appreciation for the political process. Therefore, the Ginsberg line of decisions
is not inconsistent with the first amendment values which the Court has other-
wise sought to advance in the case of children.
The Bellotti considerations also cut differently in the Tinker and Gins-
berg line of cases. In Ginsberg, Pacifica, and Ferber the Court had little diffi-
culty concluding that the government's interests closely paralleled parental in-
terests. By giving effect to the governmental policy, therefore, the Court was
simultaneously advancing parental interests. In the Tinker line of cases, how-
ever, the parent and child were invariably aligned in opposition to the chal-
lenged state regulatory policy. The Court uniformly supported the combined
parent-child interests against the government because the Court perceived that
the government was adopting an ideological position which conflicted with pa-
rental views and the child's interest in independent growth and develop-
ment.103 The Court thus protected the child against potential ideological ex-
100. Id. at 757.
101. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
102. See Garvey, supra note 50, at 344-49; supra text accompanying notes 48-
62.
103. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the Court
invalidated a criminal conviction obtained by Wisconsin against Amish parents for vio-
lation of the state's compulsory education law. The Court ruled that the state's interest
1985]
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ploitation by the state and it likewise protected parental child-rearing
interests. Furthermore, in the Tinker line of cases older and relatively more
mature children often were the ones primarily affected by the governmental
policy. The Court was therefore able to extend constitutional protection to
these children on the underlying theory that they were capable of exercising
independent judgment.20
C. The Pico Reconciliation
In many respects, the Pico decision achieves a rough accommodation of
the considerations set forth in these earlier decisions. The Pico holding can be
viewed as consistent with the judicial review philosophy and general first
amendment principles reflected in the Tinker line of decisions. Whereas the
Meyer and Epperson decisions sanctioned judicial review of public school cur-
riculum policies, Pico is actually more limited since it only provides for judi-
cial review of library book removal decisions. In Tinker and the related deci-
sions, the Court relied upon the concept of neutrality to provide first
amendment protection. Pico similarly extends student first amendment rights
into the school library context by relying largely upon the principle of govern-
ment neutrality to restrain educational authorities from limiting the materials
and viewpoints available to students.'0 5 Viewed from this perspective the Pico
holding, therefore, is not a dramatic departure from precedent.
Viewed from another perspective, however, the Pico plurality opinion no-
ticeably extends first amendment doctrine by recognizing a student's right to
receive information in the public school setting. The right to receive informa-
tion is built upon the Court's prior rulings recognizing the value that individu-
als and society derive from public access to information. 0 6 The importance of
free speech values in the case of children likewise seems to justify adoption of
a right of access to information or ideas for secondary students. But the Pico
dissenters were particularly troubled by this aspect of the plurality's opin-
ion. 10 7 The crux of the disagreement between the plurality and dissent centers
on whether the public school or public school library is an appropriate forum
for recognition of a student's constitutional right to receive information. Given
the nature of the public education process, the plurality appears correct in its
conclusion that at least a limited version of the first amendment right to know
in its attendance laws could not prevail over the first amendment claims of the parents
and their children who relied upon their individual religious beliefs to defend against a
state enforcement proceeding.
104. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 241-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
105. 457 U.S. at 865, 879-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
106. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); see also Emerson, Legal Foundations of the
Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
107. 457 U.S. at 887 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 910 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); see also id. at 878 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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doctrine should extend to secondary students in this setting.108 The informa-
tion distributing function of the public schools is too important from the per-
spective of students and society to justify foreclosing constitutional protection.
Thus, the dissenters' response that students can receive the information from
other sources is simply inadequate and shortsighted.10 9 Nevertheless, the right
to know doctrine is probably not crucial to the resolution of most Pico-related
disputes. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion demonstrates that it is possi-
ble to resolve the dispute by relying upon less controversial aspects of tradi-
tional first amendment doctrine.
It is possible to reconcile the Pico ruling with the Bellotti considerations
that have caused the Court to restrict the scope of constitutional protection
available to children. In Pico, the Court confronted the prospect of possible
exploitation of school children from two different perspectives. The Court was
concerned that local education officials might attempt to sanitize the school
library of materials with which they disagreed, thus engaging in a type of
ideological exploitation. 1" 0 On the other hand, the Court was unwilling to re-
strain local officials who sought to protect children from pornographic-type
materials and other materials without educational merit. Consequently, the
Court relied upon the Tinker principle of government neutrality to prohibit
school officials from removing materials just because they disagreed with their
point of view. The Court also drew from the Ginsberg line of cases to enable
school officials to remove materials which they perceived to be of de minimus
value in the educational mission, either because the materials were "perva-
sively vulgar" or "educationally unsuitable.""' The "pervasive vulgarity"
standard is consistent with the standard enunciated by the Court in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation,"' while the "educational suitability" standard can be
108. See infra Part IV(A); see also van Geel, supra note 67.
109. 457 U.S. at 915 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Moreover, the argument that
students may search out the information from other sources overlooks the importance
of the factor of timeliness in determining whether constitutional protection is available
to children. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1979).
110. 457 U.S. at 870-71. See Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm.,
454 F. Supp. 703, 714 (D. Mass. 1978); M. YUDOFF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 226
(1982).
111. 457 U.S. at 871.
112. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Justice Steven's plurality opinion in Pacifica adds
nonobscene "patently offensive sexual and excretory language" which is "vulgar" and
"shocking" to the list of types of speech which are of limited social utility, and thus not
entitled to full first amendment protection. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942). In Pacifica, the Court concluded that the FCC could regulate
the broadcast of this type of language (George Carlin's Seven Dirty Words Mono-
logue) to channel it to the times of day when children and unwilling adult listeners
were least likely to be in the audience. Although Justice Powell, who concurred in the
Pacifica ruling, attempted to avoid passing judgment on the content of the "speech" at
issue, he still characterized the monologue as employing "vulgar" and "offensive" lan-
guage in a manner that created a "verbal shock treatment." 438 U.S. at 757 (Powell,
J., concurring). The Pico standard of "pervasive vulgarity" is tantamount to this
Pacifica standard, particularly since the Court's underlying concern in both cases was
1985]
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analogized to the "substantial disruption" standard adopted by the Court in
Tinker. If the material is unsuitable for educational purposes, then it threatens
the integrity of the educational process in much the same way that disruptive,
unrestrained student speech threatens the same process. 113
The Pico accommodation between the Tinker and Ginsberg principles
also protects students who might lack judgment and maturity from exposure to
materials which could be harmful to them. Since officials are authorized to
remove materials which are "pervasively vulgar" or "educationally unsuita-
ble," students, regardless of their judgmental capacities, are unlikely to suffer
adverse consequences from exposure to divergent and conflicting viewpoints
reflected in the library collection. Should the student select a book which in-
troduces him to troublesome (but nonetheless educationally appropriate) ideas,
he can turn to his parents, teachers, or the school librarian" 4 for additional
information to assist him in making an informed judgment on the matter. In-
deed, this is a vital part of gaining maturity and perspective. Since students
voluntarily select their library reading materials, however, those who are of-
fended or suspicious of certain materials can simply avoid them or consult
with their parents or others.
The Pico accommodation does not necessarily place the state at odds with
parental interests in child-rearing matters. While the Pico litigation and simi-
lar cases have been triggered by parents who were unhappy with school library
reading materials," 5 some (perhaps many) parents did not subscribe to the
views of those who protested. Since parents inevitably disagree on many as-
the potential harm to children which might result if the appropriate officials were una-
ble to regulate on this basis.
113. Cf. 457 U.S. at 919-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that library re-
moval challenges could be decided under the Tinker standard of "material and sub-
stantial interference" with the educational process). It is true that application of the
Pico "educational suitability" standard involves some consideration of the content of
the material at issue and, thus, poses the possibility of censorship based upon official
disagreement with the viewpoint expressed. Nevertheless, there are several, basically
objective factors which can be relied upon in making a determination of "educational
suitability" regarding library materials: grade level and sophistication of the material;
relevance of the material to educational goals and the curricular program; and the
quality of the material as related to educational goals (i.e., grammar used properly,
etc.). Moreover, it is ordinarily not that difficult to ferret out impermissible motivations
underlying a removal decision. See infra text accompanying notes 210-16.
114. An "unsanitized" school library should enable the student to secure infor-
mation challenging, refuting or confirming whatever is troubling him. Pico, 457 U.S. at
869 (citing Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715
(D. Mass. 1978)); cf. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582
(6th Cir. 1976) (student can consult school library to supplement classroom work or
discussions).
115. It has not invariably been the parents of schoolchildren who complained
about library materials; occasionally school board members and others without children
in the public schools have initiated the complaint. See Zykan v. Warsaw Community
School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F.
Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
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pects of public education, including the content of much that is taught, local
officials cannot accommodate all viewpoints. At least in managing the school
library, the Pico ruling insures that school officials will not take sides in vari-
ous local controversies since they must manage the library in a neutral fash-
ion. Parents can be assured, however, that school officials have sufficient con-
trol over the library collection to see that it supplements rather than disrupts
the school's educational mission. Beyond this, the state cannot act practically
on behalf of parents without overlooking the constitutional interests of the stu-
dents and undermining the cultural pluralism and diversity of opinion which
prevails in most communities. If parents object to educationally-related mater-
ials that their children select from the school library, this matter should be
resolved between parent and child." 6
The Pico ruling reasonably adapts first amendment doctrine to the special
circumstances presented by the public school library book removal contro-
versy. Drawing upon precedent, the Court in Pico articulated standards that it
has previously applied to students in the public school setting or that are anal-
ogous to such standards. Thus, lower courts that will be called upon to imple-
ment Pico should be able to apply the standards appropriately." 7 Viewed from
this perspective, then, Pico simply represents further fine-tuning of first
amendment jurisprudence in the public school environment." 8 Moreover, the
Court's rationale reflects a broad-based view of the public education process
which complements the first amendment values that the Court seeks to
protect.
IV. PUBLIC EDUCATION AND THE COURTS
The Supreme Court has recognized the substantial state interest in the
maintenance and administration of its public school system by referring to the
116. Pico does not present the first amendment claim in the context of a parent-
child clash. Instead the minor plaintiffs in Pico proceeded with the litigation through
their parents as next friends. In effect, then, by sustaining the first amendment claim
the Court is reinforcing the child-rearing decisions of a segment of the Island Trees
parents. While this does not reflect the views of other Island Trees parents who prefer
their children shielded from the library books, it does not necessarily impose the views
of the state or others over these parents and their children. Since library use is optional,
it simply puts the government in a neutral position and places responsibility for the
reading decision on the parent and child. While it is certainly possible that a child
might subvert parental wishes by securing a forbidden book at the school library-thus
effectively elevating the child's first amendment right over the parental child-rearing
right-this situation is probably beyond the effective reach of the law since it indicates
that considerable problems most likely are present in the parent-child relationship. This
calls for a familial resolution, not a judicial-legislative solution. See Keiter, supra note
66, at 508-15.
117. See infra Part V.
118. See Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982
SUP. CT. REV. 285, 308-17.
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provision of public education as among the state's most important functions. 1 9
The Court has particularly emphasized the importance of public education to
society since the public schools play a vital role in transmitting fundamental
values to students and preparing them to assume citizenship responsibilities.
Relying upon this value inculcation model of public education, the Court has
concluded that judicial intrusion in public education matters is generally inap-
propriate. But in the first amendment area, the Court has adopted a broader
view of public education, sanctioning judicial intervention on behalf of stu-
dents to protect important constitutional values. While the plurality opinions
in Pico reflect this more expansive view of public education, they do not fully
present the case in support of a multi-dimensional model of public education
and they do not adequately demonstrate the inappropriateness of a judicial
nonintervention posture in this type of dispute.
This section will re-examine the Court's traditional assumptions concern-
ing public education and the legitimacy of judicial review of educational dis-
putes. 120 It will suggest that a multi-dimensional model of public education
represents a more complete view of the contemporary educational process and
more accurately reflects the individual and community interests affected by
the public schools. The section then will re-evaluate the Court's deferential
judicial review posture in view of these conclusions and the influence of pre-
sent day realities on local governance of the public schools. It will conclude
that compelling arguments exist to sanction active judicial review of student
first amendment claims.
A. The Multi-Dimensional Model of Education
Although the plurality and dissenting justices in Pico offered differing
perceptions of public education, they acknowledged and accepted the validity
of the value inculcative model of public education. They agreed'that the public
schools serve an important governmental interest by transmitting and inculcat-
ing basic values and traditions. The value inculcative model of public educa-
tion has been long recognized by the Court and seems consistent with Ameri-
can tradition.' 2 ' In Brown v. Board of Education,"' the Court emphasized
"the importance of public education to our democratic society" by asserting
119. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
120. The Court has presumed that education-related decisions implemented by
local officials reflect majority community sentiments and values. If not, according to
the Court, the local political process is readily available to check unnecessary govern-
mental excesses. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 891 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); see also Diamond, The First Amendment and
Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REv. 477, 509
(1981); infra text accompanying footnotes 219-22.
121. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Diamond, supra
note 120, at 506.
122. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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that it forms the "very foundation of good citizenship. ' 123 The Court stated
that the public school is "a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a
democratic system of government."'1 24 The public school's function, as set forth
by the Court, involves introducing students to traditional democratic values
and ideals to preparethem for participation in the political system. 125 Scholars
examining the role of public education also support this view of the public
schools . 26
Justice Powell particularly has expounded this value inculcation model of
public education. For instance, in Goss v. Lopez,1"7 he dissented from the ma-
jority view imposing due process safeguards on school suspension decisions by
asserting that the state's interest in education was properly served when stu-
dents were acquainted with the need for discipline: "Education in any mean-
ingful sense includes the inculcation of an understanding in each pupil of the
necessity of rules and obedience thereto. This understanding is no less impor-
tant than learning to read and write.""2s In Ambach v. Norwick,a92 Justice
Powell concluded for the Court that public school teachers perform a task that
"goes to the heart of representative government" and he held, therefore, that
alien residents could be disqualified from teaching in a state's public education
system.130 He emphasized that the public schools were responsible for preserv-
ing cultural values and transmitting them to the students to assure mainte-
nance of our social and political institutions.' 3 ' More recently, in Plyler v.
Doe," 2 Justice Powell joined four other Justices to invalidate the Texas statute
which denied free public education to illegal alien school children on the
ground that implementation of the statute threatened to create "an underclass
of future citizens and residents."" 33 Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Pico
relies, in part, on his view that the plurality decision undermines future efforts
by local school boards to impart ideas and values which it believes are consis-
123. Id. at 493.
124. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (quoting Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
125. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
126. See, e.g., J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY & EDUCATION 26 (1929); N. EDWARDS
& H. RICHEY, THE SCHOOL IN THE AMERICAN SOCIAL ORDER 623-24 (2d ed. 1963).
127. 419 U.S. 565 (1975); cf. BeVier, Justice Powell and the First Amendment's
Societal Function: A Preliminary Analysis, 68 VA. L. REV. 177 (1982) (the author
argues that Justice Powell's first amendment opinions have emphasized the role of the
amendment in assuring the integrity of the political process, rather than its role in
promoting individual self fulfillment).
128. 419 U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting).
129. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
130. Id. at 80-81.
131. Id. at 76-77.
132. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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tent with community views.""
The value inculcation model of public education is directly related to soci-
etal interests in the maintenance of the existing social order and established
community values. This perception of public education promotes the collective
welfare of society since it insures stability and continuity in basic institutional
structures.1 35 Additionally, the inculcative model recognizes that students ben-
efit as individuals from the public educational system. The model perceives
students as future participants within the democratic process and it seeks to
prepare them for their roles as voting citizens and societal leaders through
exposure to traditional values and beliefs.'36 Since the inculcative model is
largely premised upon a collectivist view of society and its institutions, the
Court has indicated that courts generally should defer to the majoritarian po-
litical judgments reached by local communities as reflected by school board
policies and educational practices.
The inculcative model of public education, however, is one dimensional
and presents too limited a view of the role and function of education in Ameri-
can society. The Court has recognized a broader concept of education, particu-
larly at the university and secondary grade level, that emphasizes the impor-
tance of education to students as individuals. This model of education-which
can be identified as the analytical model-focuses on the role which education
plays in assuring student growth and development through broad exposure to
various ideas and beliefs.1
37
The origins of the analytical model can be traced to the Court's decisions
addressing first amendment claims in the context of university education. In
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,138 the Court sustained a first amendment aca-
demic freedom claim with the assertion that in American universities
"[t]eachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die."" 39 Similarly, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents'" the
134. 457 U.S. at 896 (Powell, J., dissenting).
135. See J. TUssMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND (1977). But see van Geel,
supra note 67, at 262-89. Professor van Geel sets forth a strong challenge to most of
the basic assumptions underlying the value inculcation model as it relates to the gov-
ernment's interests in the educational process. For present purposes it is not necessary
to address this question since this article adopts the view that public education should
mean much more than just inculcating students with traditional beliefs and widely
shared values.
136. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969);
see also Garvey, supra note 50, at 338-42.
137. The term "analytical model" was identified and applied to this type of edu-
cational process by Professor Goldstein in a 1969 lecture. See Goldstein, Reflections on
Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 612, 614 (1970).
The historical evolution of'the analytical model in public education is set forth suc-
cinctly in Note, Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right to Teach, 48
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1176, 1176-82 (1973).
138. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
139. Id. at 250; see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("The
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Court reaffirmed its commitment to the analytical model of public education
when it invalidated portions of the New York teacher loyalty plan as it applied
to university faculty. The Court concluded that the first amendment safe-
guarded academic freedom and assured open classroom discussion of all
ideas . 4'
The Court has relied upon Sweezy and its progeny to extend its university
model of education into the public secondary school setting. The Court's ex-
panded perception of secondary public education has been developed for the
most part in the context of first amendment litigation. In Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School District,'41 the Court recognized the very real
likelihood that student opinion might create disharmony or unrest within the
school. Yet it still asserted: "In our system students may not be regarded as
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the state chooses to communi-
cate."' 43 In Epperson v. Arkansas,'4 4 the Court observed that the first amend-
ment does not permit local authorities to adopt educational policies which
"cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."' 4 5 The Pico plurality view also
relies upon this broader conception of public education and the individual in-
terests that it serves. Justice Brennan notes the importance of access to ideas
to students as individuals' 46 and the role which the school library plays in
providing "an opportunity at self-education and individual enrichment.' 147
Justice Blackmun relies upon the Keyishian decision when he characterizes
the public school classroom as the "marketplace of ideas" and concludes that
school officials may not eliminate particular ideas from the curriculum because
they disagree with them. 148
Not only does the analytical model serve the individual interests of stu-
dents but it serves broader societal interests as well. The Court has asserted
that an open educational environment is important to assure that the nation
develops competent future leaders: "The Nation's future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discov-
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the commu-
nity of American schools.").
140. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
141. Id. at 603.
142. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
143. Id. at 511; see also West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
637 (1943).
144. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
145. Id. at 105 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
146. 457 U.S. at 868. Justice Brennan states:
In sum, just as access to ideas makes it possible for citizens generally to exer-
cise their rights of free speech and press in a meaningful manner, such access
prepares students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often
contentious society in which they will soon be adult members.
Id.
147. Id. at 869.
148. Id. at 877 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also id. at 879-80.
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ers truth out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection."1 " By exposing students to divergent ideas and views,
the public schools acquaint them with the parameters of public debate on is-
sues which they will face as adult citizens either as voters or leaders. Further-
more, when the educational program is not narrowly circumscribed, students
can be introduced to the pluralistic tradition and nature of our society, and
they can be exposed to the values of tolerance and understanding.
The inculcative and analytical models of education should not be per-
ceived as mutually exclusive conceptions of the functions of the public school
system at the secondary level. Indeed, in those cases when the Court has relied
upon the analytical model it has also recognized that inculcation of values is
an important aspect of the educational process. Justices Brennan and Black-
mun both take this position in their Pico opinions. They recognize and accept
the "socializing" function of public schools."' Both Justices, however, also ex-
pressly expand their conception of public education to recognize that individ-
ual student interests must be taken into account.15' Justice Blackmun relies
upon the 1943 Barnette decision to synthesize the value inculcation and ana-
lytical models by noting that, "The school is designed to, and inevitably will,
inculcate ways of thought and outlooks; if educators intentionally may elimi-
nate all diversity of thought, the school will 'strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes.' "152 Justice Blackmun correctly perceives the likelihood that
a regimented public education program linked exclusively to value transmittal
goals runs the risk of undermining that goal since our democratic system toler-
ates-even encourages-diverse opinions and social pluralism. By harmonizing
the inculcative and analytical models into a multi-dimensional model of public
education, the Pico plurality opinions set forth a more complete picture of the
contemporary secondary level educational process as it relates to the overlap-
ping individual and societal interests that it is intended to serve.
The multi-dimensional model of public education actually rests upon the
149. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), cited and 4uoted
with approval in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969));
see also Sweezey v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("To impose any strait
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in .our colleges and universities would imperil the
future of our Nation.").
150. "We are therefore in full agreement . . . that local school boards must be
permitted 'to establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit commu-
nity values. . . .'" 457 at 864 (plurality opinion). "Because of the essential socializing
function of schools, local education officials may attempt to promote civic virtues . ..
and 'to awake[n] the child to cultural values.'" Id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
151. See id. at 864-65 (plurality opinion); id. at 876-77 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
152. Id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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same basic concerns which have animated most first amendment theories.153
The value inculcation model emphasizes the important role which education
plays in preparing students for political participation. The first amendment is
also designed to protect and enhance political participation and public debate
of issues.' Moreover, the first amendment is a vital part of our society's polit-
ical and cultural heritage. The analytical model stresses the importance of ed-
ucation to students to assure their individual growth and to promote the search
for truth and knowledge. First amendment theory likewise recognizes these
goals as among the important values served by the amendment.
The Pico plurality opinion highlights the relationship between the public
schools and the first amendment by attributing public forum-like characteris-
tics to the school library without labeling it a traditional public forum. Justice
Brennan regards the school library as fulfilling a unique role in the educa-
tional process since it affords students the opportunity to explore ideas volun-
tarily.'0 5 He links the library to first amendment interests by relating the li-
brary's function to the student's right of access to ideas.1 56 While Justice
Brennan is careful to distinguish the library from the classroom, the Court
earlier in Tinker characterized the public school classroom as the "market-
place of ideas.' 57 The metaphor has obvious first amendment and public fo-
rum connotations.1 58 Accordingly, several commentators have concluded that
public schools should at least be regarded as semi-public forums.' 59 For pre-
sent purposes, however, it is not necessary to resolve this question. The impor-
tant point is that since first amendment public forum doctrine has at least
153. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 690 (1978). But see Dia-
mond, supra note 120, at 497 ("the public school is an institution largely designed for
concerns similar to those of the first amendment. . . .Thus, from one point of view,
the public schools embody in all their aspects the denial of first amendment rights.").
154. This is not to suggest that the first amendment interests of the student and
the adult voting citizen are identical, or that they have the same interests in the politi-
cal process. But the student has a considerable interest in developing his abilities to
participate effectively and knowledgeably in the political arena. See supra text accom-
panying notes 55-59.
155. 457 U.S. at 869. Notably, Justice Blackmun is unwilling to attribute any
special status or constitutional significance to the school library. Id. at 878 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
156. Id at 867; accord Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976) (school library recognized
as a semi-public forum).
157. 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S at 603); see supra text ac-
companying note 75.
158. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
159. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 690 (1978); Nahmod, Be-
yond Tinker: The High School as an Educational Public Forum, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 278 (1970); Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 863, 885 (1979); see also
Harpaz, A Paradigm of First Amendment Dilemmas: Resolving Public School Library
Censorship Disputes, 4 W. NEW. ENGL. L. REV. 1, 51 (1981).
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s6me limited application in the public school environment, this lends addi-
tional support to the concept of a multi-dimensional model of education. Fur-
thermore, recognition of the clear parallels between the public school and the
Court's perception of a public forum illustrates how far off the mark Justice
Rehnquist was in his Pico dissent when he argued that the government should
be treated differently for first amendment purposes when it is acting as an
educator rather than as the sovereign. 160
Integration of the inculcative and analytical models of public secondary
education into a multi-dimensional model also is particularly appropriate be-
cause of the role assumed by the public schools in today's society. The number
of students graduating from high school and attending college has increased
tremendously in recent years. Whereas high school graduation and college ma-
triculation was the exception rather than the rule before the mid-1900's, this
pattern has been reversed during the past three decades."' 1 The high school
educational experience provides important and necessary training for a sub-
stantial number of students who will pursue college studies. This, of course,
has influenced the nature of the public education process. Public school curric-
ulums have been revised to meet college preparation demands. This has eroded
the provincial nature of many public school curriculums because they have
often proven inadequate to provide the required educational foundation for
college study.162 It is a mistake, therefore, to draw a bright line between the
secondary school experience and the college experience, and to urge a simplis-
tic view which perceives secondary education as completely (or even largely)
devoted to value inculcation goals.16 3 Furthermore, for those students who do
not pursue a college education, high school represents their last opportunity
for exposure to different ideas and perspectives through the educational pro-
cess before they assume adult responsibilities in the community.
Finally, adoption of the multi-dimensional model is supported by the fact
that the state enjoys a monopoly-like power over the educational curriculum
and program. Under the one-dimensional model of public education the state
is in a position to exploit its position and severely limit the material available
to students. However, adoption of the multi-dimensional model recognizes that
the public school's instructional task involves a multi-faceted undertaking and
. 160. 457 U.S. at 908-09 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, (1983), wherein the Court concludes that
even when a forum falls into the least-protected public forum category, the government
must abide by the neutrality standard. Id. at 46; see also infra text accompanying
notes 203-06.
161. D. RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1945-1980
324 (1983). During the mid-1940's approximately 40 out of 100 high school students
actually graduated and 16 of these graduates entered college. By 1980, approximately
75 out of every 100 students graduated from high school, and 45 of these graduates
entered college. Id.
162. Id. at 230-32.
163. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 914 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Diamond, supra
note 120, at 498.
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provides at least a limited first amendment counterweight to the state and any
overzealous ideological aspirations that it might possess."" It was appropriate,
therefore, for the Court to rely upon the broader model of public education in
Pico to reject assertions that the school library-and secondary schools gener-
ally-could eliminate particular materials in order to expose students only to
widely accepted views and traditional beliefs. Moreover, additional considera-
tions also support the Court's decision to intervene in Pico, and perhaps more
broadly in educational matters touching upon student first amendment
interests.
B. The Case for Judicial Intervention
The case against judicial intervention in public education matters rests
heavily upon the value inculcation model of education and the underlying as-
sumptions respecting local political control over public schools. Not only is this
limited vision of the public education process inadequate, but the underlying
assumptions do not accurately reflect the current situation in most communi-
ties. On the other hand, the multi-dimensional model of public education can
be reconciled with a less deferential judicial approach to educational contro-
versies implicating student first amendment interests. This section attempts to
develop the arguments supporting limited judicial review of student claims
challenging ideologically inspired educational policies and demonstrate that
such judicial intervention is legitimate.
The Court traditionally has been reluctant to intervene in public educa-
tion disputes because it has perceived that educational decisionmaking is
largely a local matter. The value inculcation model supports this position since
the school's role is characterized by the transmission of shared community
beliefs and values to the students. Consequently, the local political process,
rather than the federal court, is regarded as the appropriate forum available to
dissatisfied citizens who wish to challenge educational policies which they find
unacceptable. 1 65 Chief Justice Burger reiterates this view in his Pico dissent
when he characterizes the political aspect of local school board affairs as "de-
mocracy in a microcosm. ' 166 Justice Powell similarly concludes that "no single
agency of government at any level is closer to the people whom it serves than
the typical school board."'' 6 7 Both Justices emphasize the extent to which par-
ents generally .are able to participate in educational decisionmaking through
involvement with school board elections, the board itself, and various related
organizations such as parent-teacher associations.'6 " They conclude, therefore,
that decisionmaking in local school matters should reside with school boards
and administrators, and that the courts should defer to judgments reached by
164. See Yudof, supra note 159, at 885.
165. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
166. 457 U.S. at 891 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 894 (Powell, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 891 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 894 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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these bodies regarding such matters as the content of a school library.
Despite the Pico dissenters' perception that school board policies mirror
community sentiment, there is reason to question the representativeness of
many school boards and whether their policies are truly reflective of commu-
nity views and values. Although school board elections are open to all local
citizens,10 9 board elections are characterized by low voter turnouts. 70 Affluent
citizens in the community are more likely to participate in the election than
their less affluent counterparts.117 Most board elections are non-partisan; they
are often uncontested and rarely reflect ideological differences between the
candidates. 172 Incumbents usually can be expected to win re-election.' 3 Local
citizens generally demonstrate a low level of knowledge about public education
issues and the local school system.17 4 Occasionally a school board election will
raise a controversial issue stirring considerable public interest and a high voter
turnout rate, but this is not representative of most board elections. 75 Zeigler
and Jennings conclude in their comprehensive study, Governing American
Schools, that the school board election process does not reflect "democracy in
a microcosm" and might be regarded as inherently discriminatory: "It is pat-
ent that, when measured against the yardstick of a classic democratic theory
of leadership selection, school district governance hardly comes through with
flying colors." 176 Furthermore, interest groups, such as parent-teacher associa-
tions, that seek to influence local educational policies are rarely representative
of the community as a whole and they are frequently ineffective. 77 Perhaps
the anti-democratic nature of school board governance can be explained par-
tially by Professor Wirt's observation that educational issues involve "marginal
politics" since most major educational matters tend to be resolved beyond the
local level.'78
169. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
170. F. WIRT & M. KIRsT, THE POLITICAL WEB OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS 10, 76
(1972); L. ZEIGLER & M. JENNINGS, GOVERNING AMERICAN SCHOOLS: POLITICAL IN-
TERACTION IN LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS 249 (1974).
171. Mann, Participation, Representation and Control, in THE POLITICS OF ED-
UCATION 74 (J. Scribner, ed. 1977).
172, See L. ZEIGLER & M. JENNINGS, supra note 170, at 244-45; F. WIRT & M.
KIRST, supra note 170, at 62-64; Stelzer, School Board Receptivity-A Representation
Study, 5 EDUC. & URB. Soc'Y, 67, 78 (1972); Nielsen & Robinson, Partisan School
Board Elections: New Evidence to Support the Case for Them, 29 ADMINISTRATOR'S
NOTEBOOK, No. 3 (1981).
173. See L. ZEIGLER & M. JENNINGS, supra note 170, at 244; F. WIRT & M.
KIRST, supra note 170, at 64.
174. Mann, Democratic Theory and Public Participation in Educational Policy
Decision Making, in THE POLICY OF THE SCHOOL 6-12 (F. Wirt, ed. 1975).
175. Wirt, School Policy Culture and State Decentralization, in THE POLITICS
OF EDUCATION 186 (J. Scribner, ed. 1977).
176. L. ZEIGLER & M. JENNINGS, supra note 170, at 244-45.
177. Id. at 245-46; F. WIRT & M. KIRST, supra note 170, at 76; Mann, Partici-
pation, Representation and Control, in THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION 78-90 (J.
Scribner, ed.) (1977).
178. F. WIRT & M. KIRST, supra note 170 at 186; see also infra text accompa-
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While education has historically been largely administered and supervised
at the local level," 9 this tradition has changed dramatically over the past
thirty years. Just as the Court in Brown v. Board of Education8 " could note
the remarkable evolution in education during the fifty year period preceding
the decision,' 8' today a similar evolution has occurred in public education to
diminish the extent of local control over educational matters. There has been
significant recent federal involvement in education with the passage of legisla-
tion such as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965's' and the
establishment of the Department of Education as a separate cabinet level ex-
ecutive department. 183 The federal courts have a lengthy record of intervention
in local school district affairs during the past thirty years in support of deseg-
regation efforts.8 4 Several national organizations wield considerable political
muscle in Congress and elsewhere, and they are increasingly influential in di-
recting educational policy at the national and local level. 18 5
State involvement in educational matters that previously were handled at
the local level has also increased noticeably. A number of states, often re-
sponding to adverse court decisions, have revised local property tax based edu-
cational financing schemes to equalize expenditures throughout the state.'8s
This has necessarily increased state involvement in educational financing mat-
ters. During the past thirty years, there has been a notable trend toward the
consolidation of school districts which has undercut the tradition of local con-
trol and the insularity of many local school systems, particularly when rural
districts have joined with their urban neighbors. 8 7 Many states have retained
a significant degree of control over a variety of educational matters including
accreditation standards, teacher certification requirements, and curricular and
nying footnotes 179-88.
179. There are approximately 15,000 school districts in the country and approxi-
mately three quarters of them are governed by locally elected school boards. Pico, 457
U.S. at 891 n.6 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Diamond, supra note 120, at 509 n.142.
180. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
181. See id. at 489-90.
182. 20 U.S.C. § 236 et seq.
183. 20 U.S.C. § 1221(a) et seq.
184. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1972); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Goldstein, supra note 137, at 614.
185. In 1960, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) represented more
than 50,000 teachers; by 1978 the AFT had over 500,000 members. The National Edu-
cation Association (NEA) had over 700,000 members in 1960, and by 1978 its ranks
had increased to 1,700,000 members. "By the mid-1970's, there was nothing tenuous
about the position of teacher unions . . . . Indeed, both the AFT and the NEA had
become major powers, not only in their school districts but in state legislatures and in
the nation .... ." D. RAVITCH, supra note 161, at 313-15.
186. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971).
187. Between 1945 and 1980, the number of school districts dropped from
100,000 to 16,000. While student enrollment practically doubled during this time, the
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textbook decisions.1 88
All of this suggests that outside intervention, including judicial interven-
tion, into local educational affairs to implement values other than those recog-
nized by local authorities is not as unusual an intrusion as it may once have
appeared. This undermines the argument supporting judicial deference to local
educational judgments since local interests are no longer necessarily reflected
in many educational policies. Furthermore, given the dynamics of the local
political processes in school board elections, it is incorrect to conclude that a
judicial order overturning an educational decision inevitably conflicts with
community views. Such intervention is at least likely to meet with considerable
minority support.
The Court has correctly indicated that judicial review of student constitu-
tional challenges to public education policies should be limited to those in-
stances when paramount national values supersede local interests."8 9 This ap-
proach is inherently consistent with the role assumed by the Court in
protecting the constitutional rights of individual citizens against the
majoritarian political process. 190 The Court relied upon this counter-
majoritarian rationale for judicial intervention in Barnette when it overturned
a state board of education compulsory flag salute policy:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts. One's right to . . . free speech . . . may not be submitted to
vote .... 191
Similarly, the Tinker and Pico decisions can be understood as cases where the
constitutional values were too important to subordinate to the value judgments
of local school officials, regardless of whether they enjoyed widespread public
support for their position.
The limited judicial intervention in public school matters sanctioned by
the Court to protect student first amendment interests supports the conclusion
that the courts should evaluate these types of claims in light of the multi-
dimensional model of education. In fact, judicial acceptance of the multi-di-
mensional model of education further undercuts much of the strength of the
argument against intervention since the model regards the inculcation of com-
munity values as only one aspect of the educational process. The multi-dimen-
sional model also attaches considerable significance to individual inter-
ests-the same sort of individual interests which the first amendment is
designed to protect.1 92 Therefore, by relying upon the multi-dimensional model
188. See Diamond, supra note 120, at 506 n.130. See generally Wirt, What
State Laws Say About Local Control, 59 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 517, 517-20 (1978).
189. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
190. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST 75-77 (1980).
191. 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
192. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
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the Court has embraced the view that educational decisionmaking should re-
flect individual as well as communitarian considerations, and it has signaled its
willingness to intervene to protect both of these interests.
If the Court adopted a deferential approach and refused to intervene in
educational controversies, including those based on first amendment claims,
there is a serious risk that constitutional values would be devalued in the pub-
lic school setting. Such an approach would undercut even those aspects of the
educational mission which are designed to impart societal values and norms.1 93
Certainly the first amendment is a central tenet in our political heritage, and
the public schools should not ignore its presence either in their instructional
programs or administrative practices. Moreover, a policy of judicial deference
would assure a high degree of uniformity and conformity within the public
schools. Of course, this is precisely the goal of the value inculcation model.194
Professor Diamond, who argues for judicial deference to local educational poli-
cies even in the face of first amendment claims, acknowledges as much when
he characterizes the public schools as "value inculcators for creating the
proper citizen."'195 But the courts need not adopt such a limited vision of the
public education process.
The multi-dimensional model of education envisions a broad role for the
secondary schools--one that introduces students to the values of free and open
inquiry, diversity of opinion, and tolerance in a pluralistic society based upon
open and vigorous debate. The first amendment places a premium on these
same values. By judging educational decisionmaking from the perspective of
the multi-dimensional model, courts can protect against policies which directly
frustrate student first amendment interests. In fact, unless courts are willing to
intervene in appropriate cases to protect constitutional interests, society runs
the risk that the public education system could effectively stymie student initi-
ative and blunt individual growth in order to further the narrow interest of
majoritarianism. When the values at stake are this important, judicial defer-
ence without critical consideration of the individual and educational interests
193. "That [school officials] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of
our government as mere platitudes." West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
637 (1943); see also Pico, 457 U.S. at 879 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
194. It is hard otherwise to explain the Court's result in Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68 (1979), sustaining New York's statute prohibiting aliens from teaching in
the public schools. See Yudof, supra note 159, at 879-82.
195. Diamond, supra note 120, at 509 (emphasis added). In addition, Professor
Diamond comments on the societal role of the public schools and observes: ". . . virtu-
ally every purpose that the school serves is concerned with conveying information...
and indoctrinating the participants with the correct notions about information." Id. at
497 (emphasis added); see also Goldstein, supra note 137, at 614. While he admits
exaggeration, Professor Goldstein states that in the inculcative model of education
"truths" are conveyed from teacher to student and "[b]oth teacher and student appear
almost as automatons." Id.
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involved simply does not make sense, unless, of course, the courts lack the
institutional capacity to adequately formulate and apply legal standards for
the resolution of such controversies.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. The Competency Considerations
The question of judicial review of student first amendment claims ulti-
mately must take account of the institutional capacity of the courts to imple-
ment constitutional values in resolving Pico-like claims. Rebell and Block, in
their study of litigation concerning educational issues, identify several impor-
tant considerations underlying the judicial intervention decision. Their study
indicates that judicial involvement seems appropriate in those cases which can
be decided as a matter of principle or on a constitutional value judgment
rather than by balancing policy considerations. 196 The authors note, however,
that "in order to assess properly the basic claims of principle, courts must
become involved in factual and policy issues directly subsumed in the principle
issues."' 97 Thus, judicial resolution of an educational controversy requires the
court to articulate a workable principle or standard to resolve the immediate
dispute and to guide future actions by the parties. It also means that the Court
should be capable of hearing from all of the interested parties, receiving and
assimilating the relevant evidence, and resolving evidentiary conflicts. Finally,
the Court must be able to develop and implement a workable remedy.198
The Rebell and Block study concludes that courts which conscientiously
evaluate their competence in these terms before entering a public education-
related dispute can provide an effective forum for resolution of the contro-
versy. In fact, the study suggests that in several respects courts may offer a
superior forum for resolution of these matters. This is particularly true for
those disputes based upon questions of principle that allow the courts to avoid
policy considerations. 199 But the study notes that courts are capable of evaluat-
ing social science evidence as well as more traditional factual evidence. 200 The
Pico decision, therefore, should be re-examined from the perspective of these
judicial competency considerations, and the potential limits of the Pico ruling
likewise should be explored.
B. Pico and Judicial Review
The Pico litigation raised a relatively straightforward first amendment is-
196. M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 6, at 201.
197. Id. This explains the studies' hybrid category of principle/policy issues. Id.
at 200. The authors concluded that 80% of the 65 educational reform cases studied fell
into this category. Id.
198. See generally M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 6, at 3-15, 199-216.
199. Id. at 201.
200. Id. at 209.
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sue which turned upon the principle of governmental neutrality in regulating
the content of speech. There is perhaps no more strongly established first
amendment doctrine than the principle that government may not regulate
speech because it disagrees with its point of view or content." 1 The Pico mat-
ter was troubling, however, because it required application of the neutrality
doctrine in the public school setting and, thus, confronted the Court with the
question of whether the first amendment protection available to students pre-
cluded the removal of school library books. Outside of this setting the govern-
ment would clearly face constitutional restraints on its efforts to remove a
book or similar material from the public domain unless the work contained
unprotected speech or was otherwise subject to regulation to realize a para-
mount governmental interest, such as national security. 20 2
The Court recently has made it clear that the neutrality doctrine applies
regardless of the nature of the forum where the speech activity occurs. In
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educator's Association,20 3 the
Court concluded that even when the forum falls within the least protected
category of public forums the neutrality principle still applies.2 °4 The Court
held that in this case government "may reserve the forum for its intended
purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public offi-
cials oppose the speaker's view. '20 5 As argued previously, the multi-dimen-
201. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972); see also Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975). Of course the principle of neutrality is not universally true
since the Court has recognized that certain types of speech fall outside the ambit of
first amendment protection: obscenity, libel, advocacy creating a clear and present dan-
ger, fighting words, and excessively profane speech.
202. See, e.g., Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963); cf. Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1980) (recognizing government has a compelling
interest in protecting against the disclosure of secret information regarding national
security matters).
203. 460 U.S. 37 (1983); cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 n.18
(1978) (arguing that prohibiting the broadcast of excessively profane language will
affect mostly the form rather than content of communication).
204. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. The Court distinguished between these different cat-
egories of public forums. Id. at 45-46. In the first and most protected category of public
forums, the Court included places, like streets and parks, which have historically been
devoted to speech activities. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In the
second category the Court placed public property which had been opened by the state
for expressive purposes like university meeting facilities and municipal theatres. See,
e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546 (1975). The third category included public places which had not been
opened by the government to the public for communicative purposes. See, e.g., Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). At the very least the public school should fall within this
third category of public forums. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
205. 460 U.S. at 46. Pico can also be reconciled with the reasonableness dimen-
sion of the Perry test. Pico provides that library book removal decisions may take ac-
count of the "pervasive vulgarity" or "educational suitability" of the book. 457 U.S. at
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sional model of education, and the first amendment values which are implicit
within it, support the extension of such a fundamental first amendment princi-
ple as the neutrality doctrine into the school and its library. When the govern-
ment otherwise controls the flow of information within a forum like a public
school, there are compelling reasons for assuring neutrality: students are
quasi-captive audiences and teachers have considerable control and influence
over the students.208 Finally, since the Court has previously recognized the
principle of neutrality in Epperson (a school curriculum case) and Tinker (a
student speech/discipline case), it is not an extension of constitutional doctrine
to apply the principle in the school library context.
This is not to say that policy considerations did not play a role in the
resolution of the Pico controversy. The Court in Pico recognized that the stu-
dent first amendment interests must be weighed against the governmental in-
terest in maintaining sufficient control over the school library to assure accom-
plishment of basic educational goals. The case, thus, fits the mixed principle-
policy category identified by Rebell and Block. By limiting the dispute to the
library book removal issue, the plurality opinion noted that the school board's
educational mission was not severely impacted by application of the neutrality
doctrine, since initial acquisition decisions were unaffected and the holding did
not extend to curriculum decisions.207 Given the voluntary nature of school
library use, the Court is surely correct in assuming that a requirement of neu-
trality would have no greater effect on the overall educational program than
the similar neutrality requirement imposed by the Court in Tinker to limit
administrative efforts to curb student speech. Moreover, the Court carved out
two exceptions to the neutrality requirement-books might be removed if they
are "educationally unsuitable" or "pervasively vulgar"--which represent an
accommodation of the government's interests.2"8 Thus, the Court was able to
base its decision in Pico on a broad constitutional principle and adapt its rul-
ing to reflect countervailing policy considerations.
The Pico dissenters, however, argued that the Court had not successfully
articulated manageable standards to govern the resolution of library book re-
moval disputes. But the neutrality standard seems eminently workable, and
one that should be familiar to courts since it is a bedrock first amendment
principle. The dissenters were also troubled by the uncertainty which inheres
in the terms "pervasive vulgarity" and "educational unsuitability."2 They
contended that interpretation of these standards required subjective judgments
which could not be effectively reviewed by courts.
The dissenters are correct in suggesting that application of the neutrality
871. This represents a kind of reasonableness test adapted to the public school setting.
206. See Yudof, supra note 159, at 875. But see Shiffrin, Government Speech,
27 UCLA L. REv. 565, 579 (1980).
207. 457 U.S. at 871-72.
208. See supra note 205.
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test with the exceptions noted could require courts to inquire into the subjec-
tive motivations which animated a school board or an official to action. But,
courts regularly review the subjective motivation surrounding various govern-
mental actions in resolving constitutional issues. In Epperson v. Arkansas,10
the Court held that a first amendment establishment clause violation could be
based upon a finding of impermissible legislative motivation. 211 With its deci-
sion in Washington v. Davis212 the Court held that a case of racial discrimina-
tion could be established under the fourteenth amendment equal protection
clause only if governmental officials intentionally engaged in discriminatory
activities.2 13 In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Cor-
poration,214 the Court articulated a set of factors for courts to scrutinize in
determining the motive underlying an official decision. 215 The Pico case illus-
trates the usefulness and applicability of these factors in the book removal
controversy situation. The Island Trees School Board ignored its established
procedures in reviewing the challenged library books and it ignored the advice
of various librarians, teachers, and administrators l.2 1 Motive analysis, there-
fore, does not present courts with an inherently unworkable or unfamiliar stan-
dard; rather it neatly squares with constitutional doctrine that has evolved in
several areas.
This does not mean that courts will find it easy to divine improper motive
when reviewing library book removal decisions purportedly based upon the
"pervasive vulgarity" or "educational suitability" criteria. The "pervasive vul-
garity" standard seems to require that courts scrutinize a work as a whole to
determine whether profane language is used excessively.217 While there may
not be a bright line between the excessive use of profanity and its acceptable
use, Pico illustrates that isolated uses of profane words, including sexual refer-
210. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
211. Id. at 109; see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 141 (1980); cf. Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (first amendment violation
because school officials suppressed students' controversial views on the Viet Nam war).
212. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
213. In Washington, the Court rejected the argument that a showing of racial
imbalance standing alone constituted a violation. Id. at 239; cf. Personnel Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (intent required to establish sex discrimination claim
under the equal protection clause).
214. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
215. Id. at 265-68. The Court identified six potential sources of evidence to es-
tablish impermissible decisionmaking motivation: the historical background, the specific
sequence of events preceding the challenged decision, departures from the normal pro-
cedural sequences, substantive departures from prior resolutions, legislative or adminis-
trative history, and testimony from the decisionmakers.
216. 457 U.S. at 874.
217. The "pervasive vulgarity" standard also would sanction removal of library
materials containing pornographic illustrations or pictures, when these materials had
little or no relationship to the educational program. Cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 756 (1982) (state may apply reduced obscenity standard to regulate pornographic
depictions of children); Ginsberg v. New York 390 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1968) (same).
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ences, are probably insufficient to meet the "pervasive vulgarity" standard
and, thus, to justify book removal in the high school setting. 8 With younger
students, however, courts may draw the line more restrictively. 21 9 This does
not present the courts with an unresolvable dilemma because the courts can
draw upon the expertise and experience of educators to assist in reaching these
decisions. There is no reason why a court presented with the informed views of
librarians, teachers, or school administrators regarding the appropriateness of
a particular work which they have reviewed should not give credence to that
judgment so long as it appears to be rational.220 And, on the rare occasion
when a court might be confronted with conflicting professional judgments, the
court would simply have to evaluate independently the evidence presented con-
cerning the book just as it does in other disputed fact situations and resolve
the conflict accordingly. Although this might appear to be the position of the
Pico dissenters in disguise-deference to reasonable educational judg-
ments-this type of review assures that the Court will be fully informed re-
garding the merits of the work. Resolution of the controversy will turn upon
the considered judgments of educators, and perhaps others, who have reviewed
the material, rather than the passionate appeals of a segment of the commu-
nity and some of its elected or appointed officials.221
218. See 457 U.S. at 897-903 (appendix attached to the dissenting opinion of
Justice Powell); see also Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F.
Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
219. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1968).
220. Alternatively, the court could accept the reasoned judgment of an appointed
review committee that included trained educators. See Comment, The Public School
as a Public Forum, 54 Tax. L. REV. 90, 113 (1975); cf. Hunter, Curriculum,
Pedagogy, and the Constitutional Rights of Teachers in the Secondary Schools, 24
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 75-78 (1983) (arguing for a due process based approach to
curricular decisionmaking to assure all sides [teachers, parents, students, school board
members and others] the opportunity to participate with the expectation that this
should result in a decision which properly takes account of all interests). In Pico, the
Island Trees School Board had an established review procedure available, but refused
to follow it. 457 U.S. at 874-75. After appointing an ad hoc committee which included
teachers to review the books, the school board largely rejected their recommendations
for no apparent reason. Id. at 875. Justice Brennan was troubled by the school board's
unwillingness to accept the judgment of the educational professionals who had reviewed
the challenged books. He concluded that this called into question the board's motiva-
tion for the removal decision. Id. at 874-75. A similar pattern can be seen in other
removal cases. See, e.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Dist., 631 F.2d 1300
(7th Cir. 1980); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
This approach is not as unwieldy as it might seem at first. Many school districts
have established procedures, including review committees, to examine allegedly unsuit-
able books to determine whether they should be removed from the library. In a sense
this insures a kind of due process hearing for challenged works. And, in doing so, it
assures that a relatively neutral and experienced decisionmaking body will be involved
in the process.
221. This is not to suggest that the school board should have no authority to act
if it believes that books are inappropriate under the Pico standards. The board clearly
[Vol. 50
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Similarly, courts can be expected to determine whether particular books
slated for library removal are "educationally unsuitable." The court can again
rely upon the informed judgments of experienced educators so long as the
court is satisfied that the judgment reflects familiarity with the work and the
affected educational program. This approach does not differ significantly from
the judicial review function assumed by courts confronted with a Tinker is-
sue 22 and, in most cases, it will enable the court to avoid weighing conflicting
evidence. A review of the earlier book removal cases indicates that there was
rarely any real disagreement among the educators regarding the appropriate-
ness of particular works.223
Since school officials will most likely respond to book removal litigation
by arguing that their removal decision was reasonably based upon educational
considerations and reached after consideration of these factors, the court can
utilize the summary judgment device to defeat challenges that are not well-
founded.224 This approach also answers one of the Pico dissenters' major con-
cerns: the fear of extensive litigation precipitated by students or their parents
unhappy with library book removal decisions.225 Actual application of the Pico
has the authority to review books. But, in doing so, the board should at least consult
with those persons who have some experience and training in evaluating library and
other educational materials. In those cases when the school board disagreed with the
educators or a review committee's determination that books should be retained, how-
ever, the board would face the burden of establishing that it was motivated by neutral
considerations. The board also would face the task of demonstrating that the judgment
of the educators or review committee was unreasonable or simply wrong under the
applicable criteria in the event that litigation ensued.
222. In both cases courts are confronted with the question of whether school offi-
cials could reasonably reach the conclusion that they did: in Tinker that the student
speech presented the likelihood of substantial disruption, and in Pico that the book was
educationally unsuitable. If the challenged judgment rests on a basis related to the
applicable standard-rather than a subjective disapproval of the speech or book-then
the decision should withstand judicial scrutiny.
223. See, e.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th
Cir. 1980); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
224. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)
(school board decisions dismissing teacher for exercise of first amendment rights can be
sustained if the board would reach the same decision for constitutionally permissible
reasons). In fact, the lower federal courts have relied on Pico for relevant standards for
summary judgment proceedings. See, e.g., Sommer v. City of Dayton, 556 F. Supp.
427, 429 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Podlesnick v. Airborne Express, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 906,
908 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
225. 457 U.S. at 895 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell also envisioned liti-
gation in other areas, including library acquisition decisions and curriculum content
policies. Id. If Pico extends that far, and it is this Article's view that it does, the same
reasonableness standard should govern a court's review. The device of summary judg-
ment is readily available to avoid litigation in those instances when the school's decision
is reasonably well-founded. See infra Part V(C). Additionally, it should be noted that,
despite dire predictions to the contrary, the Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565 (1975), extending due process rights to students facing suspension, has not gener-
ated much litigation in its aftermath. See Timar, The Aftermath of Goss in the Fed-
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standards, therefore, is unlikely to prove nearly as troublesome as suggested by
the dissenters.
Judicial competency to engage in the task of reviewing the motivation
underlying a school board library book removal decision requires consideration
of whether a court can be assured that it will receive all of the relevant evi-
dence bearing upon the issue and whether it can adequately assimilate the
evidence and resolve any ambiguities or conflicts. As in most educational dis-
putes, there most likely will be only two sides in a book removal dis-
pute-those advocating removal and those opposing it. 2 6 While there may be
additional groups beyond the immediate parties interested in participating in
the litigation, 227 their involvement is not likely to alter the bipolar nature of
the controversy and their participation is likely to complement the positions
presented by the principal protagonists. This presents the court with litigation
in its traditional format, and it also enhances the likelihood that the court will
receive all relevant evidence relating to the dispute.228
As noted earlier, courts are accustomed to receiving evidence on motiva-
tion questions in resolving constitutional issues. It seems apparent that Justice
Stevens' observation in Washington v. Davis220 will hold true in this area: most
often proof of what happened in reaching a removal decision will be determi-
native of whether the decision was based upon official disapproval of the view-
point presented in the work. 30 Certainly this was the case in Pico and several
earlier removal controversies.23 1 In those rare instances when this is not the
case, the courts may have to assess the reasonableness of educational judg-
ments. This ordinarily should only require the courts to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence from educational professionals supportive of the de-
cision to justify concluding that the decision was reasonable. This is an eviden-
tiary task which the courts commonly perform, and it does not require any
particular expertise in educational philosophy or pedagogy.
eral Courts, 9 NOLPE SCH. L.J. 123, 139 (1980).
226. In their study, Rebell and Block conclude that in most educational disputes,
even if many parties are involved, party representation will usually be bipolar, i.e. two
conflicting positions presented to the court. M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 6, at
203.
227. Interested groups could include teacher unions, library organizations, the
ACLU, parent groups, and other school boards.
228. There is no reason to assume that book removal litigation, even with addi-
tional interested parties participating (probably only as amicus curiae), will approach
the complexity, evidentiary or otherwise, of structural reform suits aimed at institu-
tional change. See generally Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1982).
229. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
230. Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
231. See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582(6th Cir. 1976); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (D.N.H.
1979); cf. Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding state board of
regents was motivated by hostility to the content of the student newspaper when it
revised the paper's funding system).
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Given the bipolar nature of Pico-like controversies and the limited relief
requested-usually restoration of the book to the library shelves-there is lit-
tle reason to question the ability of courts to provide an adequate remedy to
resolve the controversy. Ordinarily, as in Pico, plaintiffs will request declara-
tory relief to establish that defendants violated constitutional norms and in-
junctive relief to compel defendants to reinstate the book and, occasionally, to
restrain them from future illegitimate removal decisions. Courts should not
have any difficulty providing this type of traditional equitable relief, and they
should be able to frame a remedy that is not too intrusive.2 32 An order re-
straining defendants from removing a book from the library is not likely to
intrude significantly into the educational process, particularly since it will have
no direct impact on the curriculum because library use is voluntary.2 33 Fur-
thermore, a judgment in plaintiff's favor is unlikely to require the school dis-
trict to expend any resources. Some courts have fashioned relief in this area to
take account of such factors as a student's age and parental approval.2 34 While
this might complicate administration of the injunction, these are factors which
school officials regularly are concerned with and consider in a variety of differ-
ent contexts within the educational program. Consequently, the type of equita-
ble relief required in a Pico-like dispute seems well within the traditional prov-
ince of courts, and it can be structured in such a manner that the court's
intrusion into the everyday affairs of a school will be minimized.
It is possible that courts could be confronted with damage claims in li-
brary book removal controversies. Justice Powell worried about this in his dis-
senting opinion in Pico.23 5 But, as with equitable relief, courts have considera-
ble experience dealing with damage claims for constitutional violations even in
the public education setting. In Wood v. Strickland,36 the Court set forth the
standard governing liability for school board members under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. In Strickland, the Court extended qualified immunity to school officials
unless the official:
knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took . . . would
232. Generally, courts confronted with a constitutional or statutory violation by
public education officials will attempt to frame a remedy that does not substantially
intrude into the day-to-day operations of the schools. See M. REBELL & A. BLOCK,
supra note 6, at 210.
233. It could be argued that judicial review of this type of educational decision is
always disruptive of the educational process because it creates a controversy and dis-
tracts attention away from the educational mission. But the same effect-controversy
and distraction-can be expected when a school board or other official reviews and
removes material from the library for questionable reasons. Thus, the court cannot be
blamed for this impact, since its involvement comes only after the controversy has been
precipitated.
234. See, e.g., Sheck v. Baileyville School Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679, 692 (D.
Me. 1982). The Island Trees School Board restored the removed books to the school
library shelves after the case was remanded, but the Board required parental approval
for students to check out the books. 222 PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY 260 (1982).
235. 457 U.S. at 894 (Powell, J., dissenting).
236. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action
with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or
other injury to the student. That is not to say that school board members are
"charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law." 237
Since Pico establishes the relevant constitutional principle governing library
book removal decisions, school officials can reasonably be charged with knowl-
edge of the applicable standard and it does not seem unfair to impose liability
in the unlikely event that they deliberately ignore such clearly established con-
stitutional rights.238 Proof of actual malice necessitates an inquiry into motive
as required under the constitutional standard enunciated in Pico, but this
should not present any greater difficulty than determination of the constitu-
tional violation in the first instance.239
Although Pico-related litigation raises the specter that potential damage
claims might inhibit school officials in the performance of their jobs, there are
several reasons why this is unlikely. Nearly all of the actions challenging li-
brary book removal decisions have requested only injunctive relief to restore
the book to the shelves, and not damages. This is not surprising since these
cases represent "principle" type cases, and plaintiffs have been mainly con-
cerned with vindicating first amendment values. Actual damages are often vir-
tually impossible to assess and prove.240 Generally, education officials can be
expected to comply with established constitutional standards,24 so it is the
exceptional case which might call for a damage award in the aftermath of
Pico. Also, since Pico requires a showing of an improper motive to succeed in
a challenge to a book removal decision, it places plaintiffs in the position of
meeting a high initial evidentiary burden. This and the difficulty of establish-
ing damages should discourage all but the most committed ideological plain-
tiffs from commencing litigation. In the event that a "strike suit" is filed, the
summary judgment device is available to deal with it.242
On balance, implementation of the Pico decision should not unduly tax
the institutional competence of the courts. Since the claim largely turns on an
237. Id. at 321-22.
238. It is unlikely that a court would impose pre-Pico liability in view of the
highly unsettled state of the law in this area. Compare Minarcini v. Strongsville City
School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976) with Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Com-
munity School Bd. No 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
See generally Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-65 (1978) (standards used to
determine whether judicial decisions should create retroactive liability).
239. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
240. See Developments--Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133,
1226 (1977); cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 267 (1978) (students awarded one
dollar in damages after establishing a violation of their procedural due process rights
when they were suspended from school).
241. See M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 6, at 199; cf. Regents of the Univ.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (asserting that courts should presume that uni-
versity will abide by constitutional requirements in implementing its admissions
system).
242. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 50
44
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss1/7
FIRST AMENDMENT
issue of first amendment principle, it does not unduly enmesh the courts in
educational policy determinations. The constitutional standard established by
the Court, while somewhat amorphous on its face, should not prove unwork-
able in practice if courts draw upon the expertise and knowledge of educators.
The evidentiary inquiry into the underlying motivation of school officials does
not differ appreciably from the sort of inquiry which courts routinely make in
constitutional cases. Finally, courts should be able to provide plaintiffs with
adequate relief in this area without significantly interfering with the educa-
tional process or causing a dramatic reallocation of resources. Therefore, judi-
cial review of a student's first amendment challenge to a library book removal
decision should not be regarded as an inappropriate extension of judicial
power.
C. Judicial Review After Pico
The Pico dissenters expressed considerable concern that the plurality's ra-
tionale, despite its carefully limited holding, would extend judicial review au-
thority into other areas of the school program. The Pico rationale might apply
to library book acquisition decisions, and it might impose some limitations on
the ability of school boards and administrators to structure school curriculums.
Both of these areas require some examination in light of the first amendment
principles articulated in Pico and the vision of public education which is sug-
gested by the multi-dimensional model. The question of judicial review should
take account of the institutional competence of the courts to articulate and
apply the relevant standards in the different contexts presented.
1. Library Acquisition Decisions
Although the Pico plurality opinion is limited specifically to the library
book removal issue, both the concurring and dissenting justices perceive that
the underlying first amendment principle applies equally to library acquisition
decisions.243 Similarly, if the multi-dimensional model of education supports
first amendment protection in the removal context, then it is hard to see why it
should not also support constitutional limitations in the acquisition context
since the same danger of homogenization of ideas is present. Acquisition deci-
sions, however, generally are not made in the same public setting where re-
moval decisions are made and, thus, are not subject to public scrutiny in
243. 457 U.S. at 878 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 911-12 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). As Justice Rehnquist notes, the plurality's "right to receive" doctrine
seems to apply with equal force to the acquisition decision since this is the stage at
which the government makes the initial determination whether to make information
available to students. But the courts can avoid any problems associated with the "right
to receive" doctrine by relying upon the more limited first amendment concept of gov-
ernmental neutrality. This still assures that educational decisions are made in a manner
compatible with first amendment principles. See 457 U.S. at 879-80 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
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nearly the same fashion.2 44 Nevertheless, various groups have recently ex-
pressed concern about library acquisition policies, and they have been quite
active in the textbook selection area for some time.241 There is, therefore, a
definite prospect of future litigation in this area.
The legitimacy-competency considerations which support judicial review
of removal decisions apply equally to the acquisition decision, except addi-
tional considerations confront a court facing an acquisition challenge. The ba-
sic first amendment principle of content neutrality should govern the acquisi-
tion decision and, as in the removal area, courts should be familiar with
application of this principle. However, the acquisition area presents courts
with potential policy considerations which are not as evident in a removal con-
troversy. The acquisition decision involves a choice of one or more books
among many whereas a removal decision focuses on one or a few books. Con-
sequently, in the acquisition area courts could be called upon to examine the
decision against the backdrop of a range of possible decisions which might
have been made. Courts could become mired in the dilemma of judging the
relative quality of various works. But this is not inevitable, since the initial
question is whether the decision not to acquire a particular book or type of
book was made for impermissible reasons--disapproval of the form or sub-
stance of the works which cannot be explained in terms of "educational suita-
bility" or other neutral criteria.2,1 The evidence that a court would receive to
make this determination is basically the same type of evidence that it would
receive in the removal context; and it should not prove unduly difficult for a
court to assimilate and resolve this evidence.247 So long as the court is con-
vinced that the decision was reasonably reached in light of neutral criteria or
educational considerations supported by educators who have reviewed the
244. None of the contemporary cases challenge library acquisition decisions. See
Harpaz, supra note 159, at 93. This may well be explained by the practical evidentiary
problems that confront plaintiffs who might object to the decision. See Pico v. Board of
Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 436 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring), afJfd, 457 U.S 853
(1982).
245. The Moral Majority has initiated a campaign to review the collections of
public libraries to determine whether the collections adequately reflect conservative po-
litical doctrine. See NEWSLETrER ON INTELL FREEDOM 103 (1982). Texas has been
the focus of considerable controversy regarding the school textbook selection process.
See Gabler & Gabler, Mind Control Through Textbooks, 64 PH DELTA KAPPAN 96
(1982); 12 FREEDOM TO READ FOUND. NEWS 6 (1983).
246. It should be noted that the "edicational suitability" and "pervasive vulgar-
ity" exceptions to the neutrality rule adopted by the Court in Pico apply as well in the
acquisition area. Additionally, other considerations could explain an acquisition deci-
sion in neutral terms: cost, shelf space, and existing coverage in the same area. An
acquisition determination based on any of these factors should also pass constitutional
muster under the first amendment since the decision cannot be related to disagreement
with the ideas or viewpoints expressed.
247. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text; see also Harpaz, supra
note 159, at 101.
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work, there should be no first amendment problem. 4'
Somewhat more troublesome in the acquisition area is the problem of for-
mulating an adequate remedy that is not overly intrusive. A court could en-
force a decision finding a constitutional violation by requiring school officials
to purchase additional books. This would differ considerably from the equita-
ble remedies applicable in the removal case since it would require the expendi-
ture of school resources and could redirect funds that were committed else-
where in the educational program.24 It also could involve the court in the
book selection process. But a court could avoid this unseemly intrusion by
framing an injunction to prohibit school officials from adhering to the imper-
missible acquisition policy in the future and to require officials to expend at
least a portion of the remaining current acquisition budget to remedy the vio-
lation. Given the court's explicit omission of the acquisition decision from its
Pico holding, and the dearth of case law on this point, it is unlikely that a
monetary damage award under the Strickland criteria would be
appropriate.2 50
There is, therefore, not as great a difference between judicial review of
the removal and acquisition decision as might initially appear. Courts should
be able to apply the first amendment neutrality standard in this context al-
though the evidentiary inquiry might prove a bit more difficult. If the courts
exercise their usual restraint in framing an appropriate remedy, this aspect of
the litigation should not present an insurmountable problem. The added diffi-
culty is certainly justified in order to assure that the first amendment princi-
ples underlying the multi-dimensional educational model are honored in fact
as well as in theory in the school library.
2. Curriculum Decisions
In Pico, the plurality expressly excluded curriculum decisions from its
ruling.251 Justice Brennan observed that the school board "might well defend
their claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon
their duty to inculcate community values. ' 252 Justice Blackmun similarly con-
cluded that curriculum decisions generally should not be governed by the first
amendment neutrality principle since school officials are entitled to exercise
248. See supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text; cf. Mt. Healthy City
School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (teacher dismissal case).
249. While this type of remedy would differ from the remedy in Pico, it is not
unusual for courts to utilize their equitable powers in remedying constitutional viola-
tions by requiring governmental entities to expend resources. See, e.g., Little v.
Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (state required to provide blood tests for indigent defen-
dant in paternity suit); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (court may order
compensatory or remedial education programs for children who have been subjected to
segregation).
250. See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
251. 457 U.S. at 862.
252. Id. at 869.
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discretionary judgment in this area.253 The Pico dissenters, however, observe
that the plurality's rationale seems to apply with greater force to school curric-
ular decisions than to the library setting. Chief Justice Burger, for example,
observes that "[i]t would appear that required reading and textbooks have a
greater likelihood of imposing a 'pall of orthodoxy' over the educational pro-
cess than do optional reading."254
The dissent's concern is certainly legitimate. Since the school library
serves as an adjunct to the curriculum, 255 library-related decisions cannot be
entirely divorced from curriculum-related decisions. Both are designed to pro-
mote student learning and development. Nevertheless, as Justice Brennan
notes in Pico, school library use is optional in most instances, 25 so students
are under no compulsion requiring them to read or assimilate particular infor-
mation. The same cannot necessarily be said regarding courses or materials
which comprise a school curriculum. Unless the course or assignment is op-
tional, a student will be exposed to the material and, in most instances, ex-
pected to master it. It is hard to understand, therefore, why school officials
should enjoy virtually free rein in making curriculum decisions which will have
a direct impact on all students, and find their discretion limited when they
make library-related decisions which will affect indirectly only a segment of
the student population. If first amendment values are important enough to
warrant protection in the school library, then they should also warrant protec-
tion in the classroom-where it really matters.
The Court has sanctioned judicial intervention to overturn local educa-
tional decisions in cases where it perceived constitutional values were
threatened by ill-conceived curricular requirements. In Meyer v. Nebraska257
and Epperson v. Arkansas,258 the Court upheld constitutional challenges to
state statutes limiting public school curriculums. While neither of these deci-
sions rested upon first amendment free speech doctrine, the Court's underlying
253. Id. at 878 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun noted that:
As a practical matter, however, it is difficult to see the First Amendment
right that I believe is at work here playing a role in a school's choice of cur-
riculum. The school's finite resources-as well as the limited number of hours
in the day-require that education officials make sensitive choices between
subjects to be offered and competing areas of academic emphasis; subjects
generally are excluded simply because school officials have chosen to devote
their resources to one rather than another subject.
Justice Blackmun also worries that student first amendment challenges to curricular
decisions could reach "intolerable levels if public participation in the management of
the curriculum becomes commonplace." Id.; see also id. at 880.
254. Id. at 892 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Powell observes that the plu-
rality's reasoning would sanction student oversight concerning the addition or removal
of courses from the curriculum. Id. at 895 (Powell, J., dissenting).
255. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 915 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 869 (majority opinion).
257. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
258. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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rationale in both cases can be traced to such concerns.259 This suggests that
the first amendment might be applied as a meaningful constitutional restraint
in reviewing curricular decisions. The first amendment neutrality principle, as
demonstrated by its application in the school library setting, provides a plausi-
ble standard for judicial review of such decisions. Moreover, a curriculum
which is unduly structured along partisan, value-laden lines is inherently in-
consistent with the multi-dimensional model of education. But, before conclud-
ing that judicial review of student first amendment challenges to such curricu-
lar decisions is appropriate, it is necessary to consider carefully the nature of
curricular decisionmaking in the public schools and the approaches which
lower courts have adopted in resolving challenges to curriculum decisions. The
consideration will involve review and application of the judicial competency
factors as they relate to first amendment challenges to curriculum decisions.
School boards and officials responsible for curriculum decisions are re-
quired to make a myriad of decisions allocating finite resources and classroom
time among many subjects and materials that are appropriate for instruction.
Such determinations require difficult judgments concerning the scope, empha-
sis, and treatment of the subjects, as well as decisions to incorporate, elimi-
nate, or revise subjects and materials. 260 In many instances, curriculum deci-
sions are made against the backdrop of state legislation that sets forth basic
standards and requirements for the school system while allowing local officials
some flexibility to structure their programs within broadly defined limits. 21
State and local officials charged with the responsibility of shaping and imple-
menting the curriculum ordinarily can be expected to base their decisions on
educational goals. The Supreme Court accordingly has indicated that such of-
ficials must be granted broad discretion in curricular matters, and that judicial
review authority is limited.262
Challenges to educational curriculum decisions can arise in several con-
texts and involve many different parties. As in the library setting, school cur-
riculum decisions which might prove controversial and objectionable tend to
involve acquisition and removal-type decisions. For example, students or their
parents might object to state regulatory legislation establishing such things as
required courses or standards for textbook selection.263 Or they might question
259. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968) (first amendment does
not tolerate laws that cast a "pall of orthodoxy over the classroom;" quoting Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
401 (1923) ("Evidently the legislature has attempted materially to interfere . . . with
the opportunites of pupils to acquire knowledge.").
260. Pico, 457 U.S. at 878 n.1, 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
261. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 170.011 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81(1983); Wyo. STAT. § 21-9-102 (1977).
262. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
263. See, e.g., Johnson v. Stuart, 702 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1983) (challenge to
Oregon textbook selection statute); Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 428 F.2d 471 (4th
Cir. 1970) (challenge to Maryland requirement implementing sex education classes);
cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (challenge to Arkansas statute preclud-
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the elimination of courses or materials from the state's curriculum.264 Alterna-
tively, they might object to local decisions to add or drop courses,6 5 select or
discontinue textbooks,266 and use or reject various instructional materials.26 7 In
several instances teachers, rather than students or parents, have asserted first
amendment constitutional rights to challenge these types of curriculum
decisions. 26
8
For the most part, lower courts have adopted a deferential approach in
reviewing challenges to curricular decisions. The courts have been particularly
reluctant to review course selection or content decisions. In Mercer v. Michi-
gan State Board of Education,26 9 the three judge district court rejected a
teacher's first amendment challenge to a state statute that prohibited instruc-
tion in the subject of birth control and allowed parents to withdraw students
from sex education classes. 270 In Zykan v. Warsaw Community School
Corp.,27 1 the court of appeals deferred to a school board decision eliminating
seven courses from the high school curriculum despite the allegation that the
board's action was based exclusively upon the personal, political, and moral
views of the members.
272
Similarly, the courts have been reluctant to second guess school board or
textbook commission decisions concerning the adoption or rejection of particu-
ing teaching of evolution in the public schools).
264. See, e.g., Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980)
(challenge to Mississippi textbook selection procedure and refusal to authorize particu-
lar state history text); Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D.
Mich.) (challenge to Michigan statute prohibiting instruction in subject of birth con-
trol), affld mem., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
265. See, e.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th
Cir. 1980).
266. Cary v. Board of Educ., Adams-Arapahoe School Dist., 598 F.2d 535 (10th
Cir. 1979).
267. Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, Forest Lake, 670 F.2d 771 (8th
Cir. 1982); Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981).
268. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Cary v. Board of
Educ., Adams-Arapahoe School Dist., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979); Mercer v. Mich-
igan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 1081
(1974). See generally Hunter, Curriculum, Pedagogy, & the Constitutional Rights of
Teachers in Secondary Schools, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1983).
269. 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.) (three judge court), aff'd mem., 419 U.S.
1081 (1974).
270. Cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 111 (1968) (Black, J., concurring)
(Justice Black arguing that local school officials may eliminate higher mathematics,
astronomy, biology, or virtually any subject from the curriculum without running afoul
of the first amendment); id at 115-16 (Stewart, J., concurring) (Justice Stewart observ-
ing that: "The States are most assuredly free 'to choose their own curriculums for their
own schools' "); Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.) (unsuccessful
parental challenge to state board of education bylaw requiring local school systems to
implement sex education programs in the curriculum), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942
(1970).
271. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
272. Id. at 1302.
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lar books for the classroom.2 73 In Cary v. Board of Education,2 74 for example,
the court of appeals ruled against teachers who asserted a first amendment
violation when the school board deleted ten books from the elective language
arts curriculum for political reasons which were "influenced by the personal
views of the members. '275 In Zykan, the court also rejected a student chal-
lenge to the school board's textbook removal authority by according school
officials considerable latitude to impose their personal views over curriculum
matters so long as they did not establish a rigid, indoctrinative system.2 76
Courts have also deferred to official decisions in other curricular areas, such as
the appropriateness of student dramatic productions" or the use of classroom
audio-visual equipment,2 78 and have rejected challenges to those aspects of the
curriculum.
The courts, however, have entertained some challenges to curriculum-re-
lated decisions. In Loewen v. Turnipseed,79 the district court ruled that the
Mississippi textbook approval scheme and the rating committee's refusal to
approve a particular state history textbook violated first and fourteenth
amendment rights.280 The court observed that parents, teachers, and students
had "a fundamental [first amendment] interest in maintaining a free and open
educational system that provides for the acquisition of useful knowledge." 28'
Mississippi's scheme violated first amendment rights because it provided no
procedure for review of the discretionary judgment of the textbook rating com-
mittee.28 2 In Pratt v. Independent School District No. 831,283 the court of ap-
273. See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir.
1976). In Minarcini, the court rejected a first amendient challenge to the school
board's textbook selection decisions by observing that state law empowered school
boards, not teachers or students, to exercise this authority. Id. at 579-80.
274. 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
275. Id. at 544. The court was clearly troubled by the arbitrary nature of the
school board's decision. The court noted, however, that the parties had stipulated that
there was no systematic effort "to exclude any particular type of thinking or book." Id.
Concurring, Judge Doyle argued for a standard that would prohibit boards from reach-
ing such decisions on a purely arbitrary basis; he would require the board to provide a
reason for its decision to facilitate judicial review if it were sought. Id. (Doyle, J.,
concurring).
276. 631 F.2d at 1306.
277. Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3rd Cir. 1981).
278. Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 402 (D.N.H. 1974).
279. 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
280. The Loewen litigation arose when the Mississippi textbook rating committee
reviewing ninth grade history textbooks refused to certify for adoption the book Missis-
SIPPI: CONFLICT & CHANGE, which discussed the history of slavery and race relations
in Mississippi. The court noted that the book had been favorably reviewed by several
scholars and in one study it had been ranked as the superior book available on the
subject. Id. at 1149. The court concluded that the reasons given by the committee for
rejecting the text evidenced a racially discriminatory motive. Id. at 1154.
281. Id. at 1153.
282. Id. at 1153-54.
283. 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982).
1985]
51
Keiter: Keiter:  Judicial Review of Student First Amendment Claims:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
peals sustained a student first amendment challenge to a school board decision
deleting the use of a film in high school English classes. The court concluded
that the school board had ordered the film removed because it disagreed with
the film's ideological and religious themes.28 4 Recently, the court of appeals in
Johnson v. Stuart285 extended standing to parents and students to raise a first
amendment challenge to Oregon's American history textbook selection statute
that precluded the adoption of any book which "speaks slightingly of the foun-
ders of the republic or of those who preserved the union. .. ,
In many respects, the Loewen and Pratt decisions can be compared favor-
ably to the Pico ruling. Factually, Loewen and Pratt focused on the decision of
whether to approve or remove a particular book or film for educational use
and both alleged that the decision had been based upon impermissible criteria.
Both involved challenges to highly visible, public decisions reached after some
heated controversy concerning the material. In both cases, a respected body of
educational professionals concluded that the material was appropriate for use
in the curriculum; nevertheless, this position was rejected by the authorized
decisionmakers. The legal analysis was similar in each instance. The courts
relied upon first amendment neutrality principles to review the challenged de-
cisions, and the courts implicitly adopted the multi-dimensional model of pub-
lic education by rejecting the argument that curriculums can selectively reflect
narrow, value-laden choices. In Pratt, the court pointedly rejected any distinc-
tion between the library book removal cases and the curriculum challenge in-
volved there:
That is because the effect of banning the films due to their ideological and
religious content is thesame as the effect of removing books from a library
for the same reasons. In both situations, the action of the school officials
clearly indicates that the ideas contained in the banned materials are unac-
ceptable and, hence, the exercise of First Amendment freedoms is
inhibited. 217
This suggests that the Pico holding has some currency in the curriculum area,
and that judicial competency considerations-at least when first amendment
284. Id. at 776-77. The school board disregarded the recommendation of its
Committee for Challenged Materials which was composed of two citizens, two teach-
ers, one media person, one administrator and one student and was established to review
complaints about curricular materials. Id. at 774. In rejecting the Committee's recom-
mendation, the board failed to provide any reasons for its decision. Subsequently, the
board adopted a resolution condemning the film because it unduly emphasized violence
and bloodshed. Id. at 774-75. The district court rejected the resolution as evidence of
the board's motivation, and ordered the film reinstated in the curriculum. Id. at 775.
285. 702 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1983).
286. OR. REv. STAT. § 337.260 (1983). Since the plaintiffs' complaint had been
dismissed by the district court for lack of standing, the court did not reach the merits
of the first amendment claim. The court did, however, sustain the district court decision
denying standing to Oregon teachers to challenge the textbook selection statute. Id. at
194-95.
287. 670 F.2d at 776 n.6.
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constitutional values are clearly implicated-do not preclude judicial review of
curriculum decisions.
Application of the Pico ruling in the curriculum area would require courts
reviewing first amendment challenges to apply the neutrality principle and ex-
amine the motivation, underlying official curricular decisions. Since most cur-
riculum decisions are based upon policy considerations that bear some relation
to the schools' educational mission, courts also might have to evaluate the
"educational suitability" of particular curriculum decisions. Courts, thus, run
the distinct risk of entangling themselves in educational policy considerations
when they attempt to review curricular decisions. But, while this suggests cau-
tion, it does not mean that judicial review should always be rejected in this
area. Given the mandatory nature of at least part of most school curriculums,
the potential consequences of narrow, partisan curricular decisions are consid-
erably more troublesome than those which may arise in the case of library
decisions. And, if curricular decisions were entirely insulated from judicial re-
view, the multi-dimensional model of education could be undermined in such a
manner as to render its application in the school library context virtually
meaningless.
The neutrality principle can be applied to review curricular decisions
which unduly contract or limit subjects solely because officials disagree with
the point of view or content of the material or course. Application of the neu-
trality doctrine in the curriculum area simply requires courts to make the
same evidentiary inquiry which they are required to make in evaluating li-
brary book removal decisions.2 s8 If the challenged curriculum decision involves
the removal of material from the curriculum, as in the Pratt case, the court
will have to make a relatively narrow inquiry to examine the board's motiva-
tion regarding the relevant material. If the objection is that officials have not
included particular material in the curriculum, as in the Loewen case when a
history textbook was rejected, the court may face a broader inquiry. The court
might have to evaluate the relevant material against the range of possible
choices which might have been made-much as would occur in the library
acquisition case. The evidentiary inquiry, however, would still focus on the
board's motive regarding the material at issue, and often this can be divined
easily by examining objective factors surrounding the decision. 8 9
Most curricular decisions can or would be defended as reasonable educa-
tional judgments. A court confronted with an "educational unsuitability" ex-
planation regarding a challenged curricular matter, thus faces the prospect of
deferring to this explanation or inquiring further and possibly miring itself in a
policy matter which defies principled judicial resolution. But a court is not
inherently incapable of determining whether the decision can be justified on
the basis of educational considerations. For example, in Pratt the court re-
jected the school board's after-the-fact explanation and noted that the board's
288. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
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established review committee-which included several educators among its
members-had recommended retention of the controversial film and that other
testimony from educators supported use of the film as an educational tool.
29 0
In Seyfried v. Walton,291 on the other hand, the court sustained a school board
decision to cancel a scheduled play which was regarded as an "integral part"
of the school's curriculum despite a student first amendment challenge. 292 The
court concluded that the board's decision was based upon concern over the
play's sexual content,2 93 and there was no evidence to suggest any ulterior mo-
tive. There was also no evidence presented to the court clearly indicating that
any educational professionals disagreed with the decision.294 These decisions
illustrate that judicial scrutiny of an "educational unsuitability" defense may
only require the court to examine the factual circumstances surrounding adop-
tion of the curriculum decision. If the court must inquire further, however, the
decisions also suggest that the court can utilize the testimony of educational
professionals-or the absence of professional dissent as in the Seyfried
case-to determine the validity of "educational unsuitability" claims, thus
avoiding the difficulty of resolving this type of issue without adequate
guidance.
As in the library area, courts should not face any unusual problem receiv-
290. 670 F.2d at 774, 777; see also Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138
(N.D. Miss. 1980). The Loewen court similarly rejected after-the-fact testimony of
textbook rating committee members and credited the testimony of independent educa-
tional professionals who rated the book highly. Id. at 1147, 1149.
291. 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981).
292. Id. at 216. In Seyfried, parents of three student cast members of the play
"Pippin" sued the local school board when it upheld the district superintendent's deci-
sion cancelling production of the play. Rehearsal of the play had already commenced
under the supervision of an English teacher, and the assistant principal had approved
an edited script. Nevertheless, upon review, the superintendent concluded that the sex-
ual content of the play was inappropriate and the school board agreed after considering
the views of interested parents. The suit alleged a first amendment violation in the
cancellation decision, but the court concluded that constitutional values were not "di-
rectly and sharply implicate[d]." Id. at 217. The court's decision granted educational
officials considerable leeway in structuring the school's curriculum, noting that choices
must be made in allocating finite resources, and that some of these choices would inevi-
tably suggest a preference for one set of values over another. Id.
293. Id. at 215-16. The concurring judge noted that state officials have tradition-
ally been given greater leeway under the first amendment to regulate sexually oriented
material in the case of minors. Id. at 220 (Rosenn, J., concurring). He, therefore, also
concluded that the cancellation decision was appropriate. Id. It can certainly be argued
that the Pico "pervasive vulgarity" standard might apply in this case to sustain the
board's action, as well as the "educational suitablity" standard. See Pico, 457 U.S. at
871.
294. It could be inferred that the teacher-sponsor of the production and the vice
principal who approved the script disagreed with the cancellation decision. Yet neither
of them participated in the litigation or testified. Absent contrary evidence from educa-
tional professionals, the court could legitimately accept the board's proffered rationale
for the cancellation and conclude that it represented a reasonable educational judg-
ment. See supra notes 222-31 and accompanying text.
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ing and resolving evidence regarding disputed curriculum decisions. Most cur-
riculum disputes are likely to present a bipolar controversy, thus party align-
ment will not prove difficult.295 In unusual cases courts may have to resolve
conflicting evidence from educational professionals regarding the merits of a
particular curriculurn decision, but this would simply mean that the court
must evaluate the credibility of the proffered testimony-a customary task for
courts.296 In this situation, it would be appropriate for courts to resolve the
matter in favor of the school officials whose decision is challenged if they can
offer an acceptable and credible neutral explanation for their actions which is
related to the educational program.2 97 For instance, if relevance considerations
or resource limitations dictated a particular revision in the curriculum, the
school officials should be entitled to judgment although other professionals
might disagree with their decision.
The problem of framing an appropriate remedy in challenges to decisions
to remove a text or material or to delete a course from the curriculum presents
little more difficulty than in the library book removal area. A judgment finding
a first amendment violation can be enforced by an injunction requiring reten-
tion of the challenged material or course. This should not present a financial
burden to the school system since the material has already been purchased.
Similarly, it should not prove a burden on the allocation of resources since the
system had previously provided for curricular coverage and teaching resources,
therefore, should be available.
A challenge to a curriculum decision which could be remedied only with
additions to the existing curriculum, on the other hand, presents the likelihood
that a court injunction would require school officials to reallocate financial or
other resources.298 The court must be sensitive to the resource problem in
framing an injunction for plaintiffs. Two options are readily apparent. The
court could require school officials to restructure the existing curriculum to
include the improperly omitted material and to redirect already committed
resources to accomplish this objective. Or the court could require officials to
remedy the deficiency in the future by relying upon future resources to accom-
plish the task. When sensitive considerations of this nature are involved, the
court could invite the direct participation of school officials to see that the
295. If additional parties might have some interest in the dispute, they can be
accommodated through intervention or participation as amicus curiae.
296. See, e.g., Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
297. See, e.g., Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981); cf. Mt. Healthy
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (school board dismissal
of teacher which violated the teacher's first amendment rights can be sustained if the
board would have dismissed for other, permissible reasons).
298. If officials had already decided to add to the curriculum and the lawsuit
only required the court to weigh the challenged decision against other possible decisions
(i.e. one set of textbooks was selected rather than another set), then a judgment and
injunction upholding the challenge would not involve the additional expenditure of re-
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remedy was appropriately framed under the circumstances. 99 Consequently,
while remedial problems might present themselves when courts confront cur-
riculum challenges, the problems are not insurmountable and, thus, courts
should not be regarded as incompetent institutions for resolving such claims. 300
Since courts are capable of utilizing the Pico criteria to address first
amendment challenges to curricular decisions it is appropriate to re-evaluate
the pre-Pico decisions rejecting such challenges to determine whether the
claims were properly rejected. In Zykan and Cary, the courts adopted a defer-
ential stance in reviewing school board decisions deleting particular books or
courses from the curriculum. 301 In each instance, the court was persuaded that
the school board enjoyed broad discretion to determine the high school curric-
ulum. The courts observed that book or course deletion decisions based on the
personal, political, or moral views of school board members did not raise first
amendment issues, so long as the board did not act to impose a rigid, doctri-
naire course of study or eliminate entirely particular lines of inquiry.30 2
The Pico neutrality standard, however, suggests that the courts may have
been too deferential in their review. Curricular decisions which are based on
hostility to the ideas or point of view presented in the book or course may run
afoul of the first amendment unless they can be justified on the basis of educa-
tional considerations. 30 3 While education officials clearly are entitled to make
curriculum decisions with a view toward transmitting local political and social
values, they do not enjoy unlimited discretion to impose their own beliefs over
the curriculum. 304 Since these cases involved challenges to the removal of par-
ticular books and courses it should not be too difficult for the courts to inquire
into the underlying motivation of the school board.30 5 The school board's fail-
ure to follow an established review procedure, as in Zykan, should cause a
299. This approach is routinely utilized in institutional reform and school deseg-
regation litigation. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1298-1302 (1976).
300. Since the Supreme Court has not directly addressed a student first amend-
ment challenge to curriculum decisions, a damage award would be inappropriate under
the doctrine enunciated in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See supra notes
235-39 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 271-76 and accompanying text (detailed discussion of the
facts and the court's analysis in each case).
302. See Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th
Cir. 1980); Cary v. Bd. of Educ., Adams-Arapahoe School Dist., 598 F.2d 535, 544
(10th Cir. 1979); see also Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577,
580-83 (6th Cir. 1976).
303. Pico, 457 U.S. at 871.
304. Cf. id. at 869. The plurality in Pico expressly limits the discretionary au-
thority of the school board in the case of library book removal decision, but the plural-
ity suggests that school board discretion might be greater in the classroom setting.
305. In fact, in Cary the court had no difficulty concluding that the school board
deleted the books in question from the curriculum precisely because members' personal
tastes were offended by the books. Cary v. Board of Educ., Adams-Arapahoe School
Dist., 598 F.2d 535, 544 (10th Cir. 1979).
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court to examine carefully the board's proffered explanation for its actions." 6
If the school board justified its decision on educational grounds, it then would
be appropriate for the court to consider the views of professional educators and
others who had reviewed the books and courses, assuming such evidence was
available and offered, 30 7 In both cases, teachers had endorsed the material
which the school board ultimately eliminated. Thus, unless the school board
could otherwise demonstrate that its decision was educationally reasonable or
that additional independent and neutral reasons existed, the court should find
a first amendment violation.308 In granting relief in Zykan and Cary the court
would only have to order reinstatement of the material into the curriculum
and, therefore, the school districts would not face significant depletion of their
financial resources.
The controversy in Mercer presents a different problem in determining
whether judicial intervention based on the Pico standard is appropriate. In
Mercer, a teacher challenged a Michigan statute that prohibited instruction,
advice, or information on birth control in the state's sex or health education
classes.309 A court applying the Pico criteria, thus, would be confronted with
determining the motive or purpose of the state legislature in adopting the stat-
ute-a task which is considerably more difficult than that involved in uncover-
ing the motivation of a smaller administrative body, such as a school board.310
On its face, the statute appears to violate the first amendment neutrality prin-
ciple since it prohibits virtually any recognition or discussion of the subject of
306. 631 F.2d at 1302, 1306-07. The plaintiffs objected that the school board
had failed to adhere to the "Croft policy" for review of curricular decisions. The court,
however, concluded that the policy did not officially constrain the school board under
established state law or constitutional due process requirements. Id. at 1307. The sig-
nificant fact is not the legal force of the policy, but the motivational inferences that can
be drawn from the board's failure to adhere to it. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 874-75. More-
over, in Zykan the court observed that school officials turned the controversial books
over to a local senior citizens group which publicly burned the books. 631 F.2d at 1302
n.2. As the court properly observed, this fact also bears some relevance in discerning
the motivations of the school board. Id.; see also id. at 1309 (Swygert, J., concurring)
(Judge Swygert notes that several of the deleted books dealt with the subject of femi-
nism and he infers from this a possible motive to suppress "a particular kind of inquiry
generally.").
307. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 874.
308. See supra notes 222-32 and accompanying text. The school board could, of
course, offer the testimony of other educational professionals to justify the removal
decision. In that case the court would have to evaluate the conflicting testimony, as well
as other evidence, to determine the validity of the board's explanation.
309. 379 F. Supp. 580, 582 n.* (E.D. Mich. 1974) (three judge court), afj'd
mem., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
310. See O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("Inquiries into
congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter."). But see Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) ("when
there is proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the [legis-
lative or administrative] decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified.");
Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138, 1148-49 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
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birth control. Justice Stewart addressed this problem in his Epperson concur-
rence when he observed:
It is one thing for a State to determine that [particular subjects] shall or shall
not be included in its public school curriculum. It is quite another thing for a
State to make it a criminal offense for a public school teacher so much as to
mention the very existence of an entire system of respected human thought.",
Of course, the state could still argue that neutral educational considerations
prompted the ban on the discussion or mention of birth control, but this argu-
ment loses its force since the state had otherwise sanctioned sex education
classes. The legislative purpose was apparently based on hostility to the
topic-an educationally appropriate subject in the context of a high school sex
education course. Therefore, if the statute were interpreted to preclude men-
tion or discussion of birth control in the sex education classes, a court would
be justified in finding a first amendment violation and enjoining operation of
the statute.
In Johnson v. Stuart,31 2 the court of appeals held that students and par-
ents have standing to challenge an Oregon textbook selection statute which
prohibits the use of any history text that "speaks slightingly of the founders of
the republic or of those who preserved the union or which belittles or underval-
ues their work. ' 31 3 The statute is clearly antagonistic to a legitimate point of
view and to particular information and material (some of which might be veri-
fied as historically accurate). The statute is therefore inconsistent with the first
amendment neutrality principle. Moreover, the statutory proscription cannot
be reconciled with the multi-dimensional model of public education. Perhaps
the state will advance neutral educational considerations to justify the statu-
tory restriction, but any such justifications should be carefully scrutinized. In
this event, it would be appropriate for the court to examine the opinions of
educators and historians on the subject to determine whether legitimate educa-
tional goals can be attributed to the statute. If the court voids the statute on
first amendment grounds, this should not present difficult remedial problems
since the court can issue a prospective injunction against enforcement of the
statute. By framing the injunction prospectively, the court could minimize dis-
ruption of the educational process and avoid imposing costly remedial require-
ments on the districts such as the replacement of existing textbooks. 314 Thus,
311. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 116 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
312. 702 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1983).
313. Id. at 194; see OR. REv. STAT. § 337.260 (1983). The sweep of the statute is
potentially very broad. For example, the statute seems to preclude adoption of a history
textbook which contains the accurate statement that Thomas Jefferson was a
slaveholder.
314. On July 24, 1984, the United States District Court for the District of Ore-
gon entered a prospective injunction against the Oregon State Board of Education and
the Oregon State Textbook Commission restraining them from thereafter enforcing the
challenged statutory selection criteria. The court did not issue a written opinion, al-
though the transcript of the summary judgment hearing indicates that the judge relied
upon the Pico decision to conclude that the statute violated the students' first amend-
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so long as state officials and local districts did not base future selection deci-
sions on the illegal criteria, they would retain considerable flexibility in select-
ing textbooks and structuring the curriculum.
Despite the Pico plurality's reluctance to extend its holding to embrace
judicial review of Curriculum decisions on first amendment grounds, the
Court's rationale can be extended to curricular matters since courts are not
inherently incapable of undertaking the task. Re-evaluation of the lower court
curriculum decisions suggests that review under the Pico criteria might have
led to different results in several cases, but this is only true if the education
officials were unable to offer a reasonable, neutral explanation related to edu-
cational considerations for their actions. Absent such an explanation, it is fair
to conclude that the challenged actions represent serious instances of school
board abuse of discretion. If so, then under the Pico standard, students and
their parents should be able to turn to the first amendment to challenge nar-
rowly partisan decisions which undermine the multi-dimensional model of edu-
cation. Judicial review of curriculum decisions under these circumstances
would protect constitutional values and guard against the excesses of majori-
tarianism in the classroom, as well as the school library.
This does not mean that courts will find themselves intervening regularly
in educational controversies. School officials usually can be expected to adhere
to their legal responsibilities in administering curriculum matters in a nonpar-
tisan manner and to conform to established procedures in reviewing curricu-
lum revisions. Students, their parents, and education professionals are unlikely
to undertake lightly the rigors of litigation except for flagrant instances of
abuse of official discretion. Thus, except for these rare cases, curricular deci-
sionmaking is most likely to remain in the hands of local officials and beyond
the pale of judicial oversight. When officials have exceeded or approached the
limits of their authority, however, judicial review should not be foreclosed
since the courts can present an appropriate forum for vindication of constitu-
tional principles even when curricular considerations are involved.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court reached the correct result in Pico despite the fact
that a majority of the Court was unwilling to endorse the plurality's broad
view of student first amendment rights and the school library. By relying upon
traditional first amendment doctrine and precedent, the Court demonstrated
that constitutional protections should apply in the public school setting. The
Court properly rejected the argument that judicial review of school board
decisionmaking is illegitiinate and exceeds the institutional capacities of the
courts. Instead the Court adopted the position that students are entitled to
invoke the first amendment to advance its core values. Moreover, by recogniz-
ment rights. A notice of appeal was filed by the state on August 23, 1984. Johnson v.
Stuart, Civil No. 78-770-BU (D. Or. 1984).
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ing that the first amendment applied in the public school environment the
Court correctly embraced a multi-dimensional model of the public education
system which is consistent with fundamental constitutional values. The Court's
decision should actually advance the state's educational interests and enhance
its relationship with its minor citizens.
Some difficulties may attend application of the Pico standards in library
book removal controversies, but these problems should not exceed those which
the courts ordinarily face in enforcing the first amendment. Furthermore, ex-
tension of the Pico ruling to authorize judicial review of library acquisition
and curriculum decisions reached by school officials would not unduly tax the
judicial competence of the courts. Rather, it would provide a limited check on
the otherwise discretionary authority of public officials entrusted with the truly
delicate task of educating our children. It also would give true meaning to the
first amendment constitutional values which are so inextricably related to the
public education process.
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